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USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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WORLDWIDE TOPICS

CAUSES, CURES OF UN FINANCIAL CRISIS EXAMINED

Causes of Crisis

Moscow ARGUMENTI I FAKTY in Russian No 40, 30 Sep-6 Oct 86 p 8

/Article by M. Genin in response to a question from a reader in Moscow, G. Korobov, who asks: Tell us, please, why a financial crisis has developed in the UN and who is responsible for it."/

/Text/ It is true that the United Nations Organization has recently run into serious financial difficulties. The annual budget of this largest of all international organizations comes to about 850 million dollars. However, the UN is now experiencing a shortage of ready funds equal to about 100 million dollars because certain countries, for one reason or another, have failed to make their full contributions to the UN. Besides this, we see a steady increase in capital deficits, which amounted to approximately 400 million dollars by the beginning of this year. The UN has incurred a debt in this sum to its member countries for carrying out a number of programs, payment for which is not provided for by the regular budget. Mainly this relates to the maintenance of UN peace-keeping forces in the Near East.

The financial crisis of the UN is based mainly on reasons of a political nature, related first of all to the attitudes of various countries toward the organization. Under conditions of an extremely dangerous international situation, when it is so necessary to take measures in order to prevent the world from sliding into a nuclear catastrophe and to channel the course of events in the international arena toward disarmament and collaboration, the US and certain of her allies are following a line of discrediting the United Nations. The US itself describes this line as a strategy of "managing" the UN. In order to accomodate the activities of this multilateral forum to its own imperialistic interests, to subordinate its international mechanisms and institutions to its dictates, Washington has not even stopped short of paralyzing the entire system of international organizations. Thus, the US withdrew from UNESCO when the policies of this organization turned out not to be to Washington's liking. In the past, they have withdrawn from membership in the International Trade Organization under the pretext of its "politicization" and have threatened to leave the IAEA. Displeasure is also being expressed about the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

The course of overall US policy with regard to the United Nations is also characterized by its arbitrary actions in questions of UN financing, which to

a large extent are the reason for the present financial difficulties of this organization. As is known, a year ago the American Congress approved legislation concerning appropriations for the needs of the State Department, which contained the notorious "Kassenbaum Amendment" that went into effect on 1 October 1986. With regard to the UN, this amendment boils down to a demand for "weighted voting" on budget matters, that is, in the final account, for a change in the cornerstone principle of "one country--one vote." At the same time, the US intends to reduce its contribution to the UN budget, and to continue to act in this same spirit, until the Organization accepts Washington's ultimatums. In this way, an attempt is being made to seize control of the UN "purse" and, through it, of the character and direction of the programs which it carries out. Even during 1985-1986, the US withheld a part of its contribution to the UN budget (about 70 million dollars), and it intends to do the same thing this year.

At the present time, the US Congress is examining draft legislation on reducing American contributions to the UN by the amount of the annual salaries paid UN Secretariat employees from the socialist countries.

The UN Charter envisages that all the expenses of this organization will be paid from the pooled resources of its members and that their contributions will be determined by decision of the General Assembly. All member countries are supposed to fulfill these obligations in good faith and, therefore, a unilateral holding back of assigned contributions by any member contradicts this principle and can be seen as nothing other than an attempt at political pressure.

UN Measures in Response

Moscow ARGUMENTI I FAKTY in Russian No 40, 30 Sep-6 Oct 86, p 5

/Unsigned commentary under the "The Press Testifies" rubric/

/Text/ In connection with the financial crisis of the United Nations, the organization has taken steps to reduce its budget by approximately 60 million dollars this year alone, according to the American newspaper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. The salaries of new employees have been reduced. Salary increases to compensate for increases in the cost of living have been deferred for an undetermined period. Salary scales have been frozen. Personnel travel has been cut by 20 percent, while a number of conferences have been cancelled and a number of publications have been abolished.

Offices at UN Headquarters are no longer cleaned every day but, rather, every other day. Air conditioners are being turned on at lower /sic/ temperatures than before. Cooling drinks can now be seen on every desk. The fountain was out of operation all summer, which made it possible to save 10,000 dollars for electricity.

"Hostility to the UN on Capitol Hill is so strong that it is difficult to combat it," writes THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. The US Congress is threatening

radical cuts in the still unpaid contribution of the United States for 1986, which amounts to 210 million dollars, reports the weekly magazine NEWSWEEK.

"Even last year, Congress tried to tie US financing of the UN with more fundamental changes in this world organization," writes NEWSWEEK. "The most serious measures envisage automatic reduction in the contributions of the United States by 20 percent if the General Assembly does not shift from the system of 'one man -- one vote' to a system of voting which will give an advantage to the countries which pay larger contributions." This will never find approval in the UN, opines the weekly magazine.

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CSO: 1807/25

WORLDWIDE TOPICS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TODAY'S WORKING CLASS

SELSKAYA ZHIZN Version

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by A. Belikov and N. Zhelezov, TASS special correspondents: "To Strengthen The United Front"]

[Text] The broad spectrum of problems which today face working people in various countries in connection with their intensifying struggle for a peaceful future for our planet and for social progress was discussed at an international scientific conference on the subject of "The Working Class and the Modern Age," which concluded on 10 October in Moscow. Participating in the discussion were prominent figures from the workers' movement, communist and workers' parties, revolutionary-democratic, social-democratic and labor parties, trade unions of various orientations, and other organizations and mass movements. The meeting in Moscow, which was devoted to the present-day realities of the working class' life and struggle, drew representatives from over 100 different organizations from approximately 80 countries around the world.

On the final working day of the conference, discussion of the latest tendencies and prospects in the scientific-technical revolution and of its social effects was continued, and questions pertaining to working people's struggle against militarism and reaction and the role of the working class in finding solutions to problems of development in newly-liberated countries were examined.

Under present-day conditions, militarism and the arms race are one of the primary tools being used in the struggle against the socialist world and revolutionary movements. In capitalist countries gigantic amounts of resources are being diverted from citizens' needs as the arms race intensifies. The participants in a sectional meeting on the topic of "The Working Class, Tendencies of Mass Movements and the Struggle Against Militarism and Reaction" produced convincing new evidence of this.

In speeches it was underscored that in capitalist countries the process of increasing divergence between the standards of living of wage laborers employed in "unprestigious" sectors and those in new sectors with better

prospects for the future is continuing. Capitalism is attempting to exploit this fact in order to play off various segments of the working class against each other.

Participants in the section entitled "The Working Class and the Scientific-Technical Revolution" noted that the scientific-technical revolution, which has on the eve of the 21st century opened up before humanity tremendous opportunities, has also presented humanity with serious problems. The greatest of these is how to utilize scientific and technical advances for the good of human beings and how to preserve the best which has been created by human reason from the militarists, who threaten the very existence of civilization on Earth.

The introduction of modern technology in socialist countries, as participants in the discussion pointed out, does not have negative effects on working people. On the contrary, it intensifies interdependence and interconnections between the various links and sectors in public production. It leads to increasing convergence between production and scientific activity and gives rise to a tendency toward intensification of scientific management of the economy. The transition to widespread computerization and comprehensive automation and robotization of production are now regarded in socialist countries as the decisive means of accelerating economic and social progress, raising the level of the people's welfare, and meeting people's diverse material and spiritual needs to an ever greater degree.

A meeting of the section entitled "The Working Class and Development" discussed the problems of the working class and the workers' movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Speakers touched on issues pertaining to ways to increase the political consciousness of the working class in developing countries and efforts to organize working people. Many speakers noted the tremendous internationalist role of the Soviet working class in the political tempering and professional growth of workers in developing countries. It was noted that of equal importance is the solidarity of the Land of the Soviets and other socialist states with those peoples which are struggling under difficult conditions against the continual threat of aggression by the United States.

This international forum devoted to the most important issues facing the present-day workers' movement has now concluded. The opinion of its participants about the results of the Moscow conference was unanimous: today the realities of the life and struggle of working people around the world and the realities of the nuclear age require increased solidarity among all progressive forces and the creation of a united democratic front in the struggle for peace and social progress for our entire planet.

SELSKAYA GAZETA Version

Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by A. Belikov and N. Zhelezov, TASS special correspondents: "To Strengthen The United Front"; these two additional paragraphs of the above article were published in its SELSKAYA GAZETA version]

[Excerpt] Referring to the difficulties which the workers' movement is encountering in a number of newly-liberated countries, they pointed out, in particular, the incompleteness of the process of formation of the working class and the considerable role of semi-proletarian elements, persons who until recently belonged to now-dissolved petty bourgeois strata and the peasantry within the proletariat. At the same time the stratum of hereditary cadre proletariat is growing, as is the influence of the ideas of scientific socialism.

Many speakers expressed their fervent support of Soviet peace proposals of recent years and their sincere satisfaction with the Soviet Union's responsible stance in the face of the threat of thermonuclear war. They pinned great hopes for a lessening of tension around the world on the upcoming Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik.

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SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH HUNGARIAN TRADE DELEGATION

Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHES-KIKH RESPUBLIK (OTDEL VTOROY) in Russian No 17, 1986 pp 251-253

[Agreement on the Trade Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]

[Text] The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, for the further development and strengthening of trade and economic relations between both countries, considering that the legal status of the Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Hungarian Republic is defined in the Agreement on Trade and Navigation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian Republic of 15 July 1947, and considering the desire of the Hungarian Party concerning the conversion of the Office of Trade Counsellor of the Embassy of the VNR [Hungarian People's Republic] in the USSR to the Trade Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, agreed on the following:

Article 1.

The Office of the Trade Counsellor of the Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is converted to the Trade Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, subsequently called the "Trade Delegation."

Article 2

The Trade Delegation is a component part of the Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has its seat in Moscow.

The opening of sections of the Trade Delegation in other cities of the USSR may follow by agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Article 3

The Trade Delegation accomplishes the following functions:

- a) it assists the development of trade and economic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian People's Republic;

b) represents and protects the interests of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in all questions concerning foreign trade and other types of foreign-economic activity;

c) accomplishes the trade and political direction of foreign-trade and other foreign-economic activity in the USSR by the corresponding Hungarian organizations and monitors their activity.

Article 4

The head of the Trade Delegation and his deputies enjoy all rights and privileges granted to members of diplomatic delegations.

Administrative-technical and servicing personnel enjoy the rights and privileges which, according to international law, are recognized for members of the corresponding category of personnel of foreign diplomatic delegations.

Article 5

The Trade Delegation does not bear responsibility for foreign-trade transactions concluded by its officials in the name of and on the authorization of the corresponding Hungarian organizations.

Article 6

The establishment of the Trade Delegation in no way affects the rights of Soviet foreign-trade organizations and Hungarian organizations authorized to accomplish foreign-trade operations and to maintain direct relations with one another to conclude and accomplish trade transactions.

Article 7

This agreement becomes effective from the day of its signing and will be in effect for the period of operation of the Treaty on Trade and Navigation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian Republic of 15 July 1947.

Accomplished in Moscow on 28 May 1986 in two authentic copies, each in Russian and Hungarian languages, in which regard both texts have the same force.

On authorization of the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On authorization of the Government of
the Hungarian People's Republic

B. Aristov

P. Veress

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CSO: 1825/010

SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

REVIEW OF BOOK ON ECONOMIC GROWTH OF CEMA COUNTRIES

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSR: SERIYA 1 --PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNYY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 2, 1986 pp 86-89

[Review by A. N. Vinogradov of book "Stupeni rosta ekonomiki bratskikh stran" [Stages in the Economic Growth of the Fraternal Countries] by N. V. Borokh and V. S. Glagolev (New Developments in Life, Science, and Technology; Series: Economics, 1985: 5. Bibliography pp 57-58), Znaniye, Moscow, 1985, 64 pages]

[Text] The course of socialist economic integration which CEMA member countries took in 1969 has ensured steady growth and equalization in the levels of their economic development and has facilitated deep structural changes in their economies along with priority growth rates for progressive sectors. During 1971-1983, the CEMA member countries doubled the volume of their industrial production, tripled their output of machine building products and quintupled their mutual trade. They are satisfying a considerable part of their own requirements through mutual trade. This includes 68 percent of requirements for machinery and equipment, 99 percent of requirements for coal, 70 percent of petroleum requirements, 93 percent of natural gas requirements, 77 percent of iron ore requirements, 66 percent of rolled ferrous metal requirements, and 61 percent of requirements for consumer goods (pp 5-6).

The collaboration of the fraternal countries is taking the strategic direction of scientific and technical and production cooperation. During the past period, besides carrying out joint scientific research work, the system of ties in science and technology has included the creation of joint scientific collectives, laboratories, institutes, coordination centers, and scientific production associations, joint training and increasing the qualifications of personnel, the development of an international information system, joint efforts in invention and patent and license activity, and the creation of a single system of standards for CEMA. During the past 10 years, the volume of joint research grew 5 - 6-fold (p 23). Altogether, at the present time, more than 20

percent of the scientific and technical innovations that have been introduced in the CEMA member countries are a result of their cooperation (p 25). The Complex Program of Scientific and Technical Progress to the Year 2000 encompasses 5 priority directions for collaboration -- electronics, complex automation, nuclear power, new types of materials and technology, and biotechnology.

According to the national programs of the CEMA member countries, joint stocks of robots will reach 200,000 units by 1990, of which the USSR plans to manufacture more than 100,000 industrial robots, more than 4,000 automated and semiautomated lines (p 19), about 2,000 flexible automated production systems (including completely automated sectors, shops and plants), and up to 3,000 automated planning systems (p 21).

The machine building complexes of the CEMA member countries still have not been adequately included within the rational international socialist division of labor. Joint measures to further intensify international specialization will lead to a structural reorganization of the national economies of the fraternal countries, which will take 10-20 years.

The authors believe that cooperation cannot be carried out in isolation from the program for restructuring the economies of the CEMA member countries. It should be an organic component part of the complex operations aimed at creating modern systems of machinery and equipment through joint efforts. In connection with the development of international specialization in the manufacture of units and parts, problems are developing in the utilization of relatively small enterprises, of which there is a rather large number within the machine building industries of the CEMA member countries. It is necessary to further perfect the mechanism for managing cooperative ties, both within the countries and within the organs of CEMA.

One of the most important characteristics of the modern stage of integration consists of the formation of international production complexes: sectoral (for example, the production of equipment for nuclear power plants, carried out on the basis of an appropriate general agreement on international specialization), intersectoral (fuel and power, agrarian and industrial), and territorial production complexes (they are being established either within limited regions or in connection with construction of joint projects on the territory of one of the countries). The sum total of the production and technological and the economic ties between the European CEMA member countries and the USSR forms an international production complex, which is developing on the basis of all forms of international production specialization and cooperation.

During the years of socialist economic integration, considerable progress has also been achieved in perfecting the mechanism for cooperation among the fraternal countries. Within the sphere of joint planning activity, particular attention is being given to coordination of economic policy within the strategy of mutual collaboration, which the CEMA member countries understand to mean the development, on a collective basis, of ways to solve the most important economic problems that present a mutual interest and have important meaning for determination by each of the fraternal countries of directions for economic development and collaboration for the long range future, and also to joint determination of ways to collaborate directly in the spheres of science, technology, material production and capital construction.

Improvement in the mechanism of collaboration involves expanding direct ties between the enterprises and organizations of the CEMA member countries. Even the Complex Program for Socialist Economic Integration contained a list of specific directions for the direct cooperation of organizations; however, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, many of them have not been sufficiently developed. Today, more than 3,500 enterprises in the CEMA member countries are participating in the system of direct ties (p 47). More than 1300 collectives in the USSR maintain permanent ties with approximately 1500 enterprises and organizations in the socialist countries: among them are more than 250 in Bulgaria, about 170 in Hungary, more than 300 in East Germany, about 250 in Poland, 40 in Romania, and almost 400 in Czechoslovakia (p 48). International socialist competition has a very great role in the development of direct ties, inasmuch as it can outstrip the establishment of production contacts between enterprises.

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UNITED STATES AND CANADA

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POLITICS, NOT FISH SAID BASIS FOR U.S. 200-MILE ZONE DECISION

Moscow RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 47-50

[Article by Ye.V. Alekseyev and A.A. Volkov; candidates of biological sciences V.K. Zilanov and G. M. Chursin, USSR Ministry of Fish Industry; and candidate of geographical sciences L.V. Yanik, TsNIITEIRKh, under the "Abroad" rubric: "Some Special Features in the Development of the U.S. Fish Industry Under the Conditions of the 200-Mile Zones"]

[Text] The coastal waters of the United States are a traditional region of foreign fishing, in which the total catch of other countries reached 3.5 million tons before the establishment of the 200-mile zone.

Most of the reserves of such large-scale fish types as hake, burbot, herring, perch, mintay, ugolnaya and others were detected and investigated by other countries, above all by the scientists and specialists of the Soviet Union. In this connection, prior to the introduction of the 200-mile zone Soviet fishing ships traditionally pursued their trade in both the Atlantic and Pacific waters adjacent to the coasts of the United States. Subsequently this trade was performed on the basis of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on fishing.

The objective of the current American policy in the area of fishing was defined rather openly and clearly as the gradual displacement of foreign fishing from its zone and also the utilization of fishing for political purposes. It is therefore no accident that for a number of years there has been a worsening of the working conditions of the foreign fleet in U.S. waters, which is also contributed to by changes in American legislation on matters involving fishing. In particular, they have revised the criteria under which the quotas are established for foreign states in the U.S. zone. At the same time, the Americans attach particularly great importance to cooperation by foreign states in the "rapid and full development of the fish industry of the United States" (article 1 of the standard agreement between the United States and foreign countries), in particular to the volumes of fish (raw material) taken over from American fishermen by foreign partners, the size of direct purchases of finished fish products in the United States, the participation in joint operations, etc. The traditional nature of the foreign industry and its contribution to the scientific investigations of the living maritime resources of the American zone are considered last of all. In

addition, practice shows that the Americans consider any other factors that they wish and that factors of a political nature frequently prevail in giving access to the remaining allowable catch of the foreign fleet. In this connection, the United States completely ignores the corresponding positions of the UN Convention on Maritime Law, which, by the way, it has still not signed. At the same time, as representatives of the United States have repeatedly declared, it is precisely on the basis of this convention that it proclaimed the 200-mile economic zone along its coast and is carrying out its policy in the area of the investigation and utilization of the living resources of the world oceans.

The tendency toward the curtailment of the foreign fishing industry in the 200-mile zone of the United States and the parallel development of mixed fishery operations (the establishment of mixed companies as an intermediate link) is the essence of the "Americanization" of the fish resources of the U.S. 200-mile zone.

Foreign ships carry on their trade in the American zone on the basis of bilateral intergovernmental agreements on fishing. As of 1 January 1986, 18 states, including the EEC, had entered into agreements with the United States. The foreign industry is permitted only on the basis of licensing.

Since 1976, there has been a steady decline in the quotas for foreign ships in the 200-mile American zone. Thus, the total volume of foreign industry in the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska was set at only 682,000 tons with an initial allocation to the foreign ships of quotas for 412,000 tons against almost 2 million tons in 1976.

The increase in the size of the payment for carrying out industrial operations in the U.S. zone is a component of the policy of reducing foreign licensed operations. At the same time, competent authorities in the United States explain the charging for such operations as the indemnification for expenditures for the inspection and guarding of the U.S. zone during the period of the work of the foreign fleet. The payment includes the cost of the license, collections for the catch of the objects of the work (fishing or by-weight charges in dollars per ton of fish caught), payment for the stay of U.S. observers on board foreign ships, etc.

Over the last 5 years, the value of licensing charges increased by a factor of more than three.

Table 6.

Fish	Charges in Dollars per Ton		
	1979	1985	1986
Rock trout	1.66	52.00	66.00
Yellow-finned flounder	14.24	34.00	56.00
Cod	12.56	73.00	102.00
Perch	12.46	94.00	165.00
Hake	6.16	14.00	43.00
Mintay	1.66	32.00	43.00

In 1986, charges by weight were increased significantly, in particular (in dollars per ton): to \$56 for flounder, to \$101 for cod, to \$165 for perch, and to \$43 for hake (Table 6).

It is obvious that the highest charges are set for those types of fish which the national fishing industry of the United States is most interested in using.

Table 7 gives data on the volume of foreign fishing near the coasts of the United States.

Table 7.

Year Catch in Thousands of Tons

1977	1,628.9
1978	1,753.9
1979	1,640.1
1980	1,631.0
1981	1,654.9
1982	1,414.8
1983	1,312.7
1984	1,365.8

In 1984, the largest actual catch in the American 200-mile zone was achieved by Japan, South Korea and Poland with 68, 20 and 5 percent, respectively, of the total caught by foreign ships. Whereby 97.5 percent of the catch goes to the Pacific Ocean and only 2.5 percent to the Atlantic Ocean. In 1984, the catch (in thousands of tons) amounted to:

Canada	12.2
EEC	24.5
FRG	11.2
GDR	5.4
Poland	69.8
Portugal	0.2
Spain	4.1
USSR	23.2
Japan	940.7
South Korea	274.5

By type, 98 percent of the foreign catches were composed of large-scale types of fishes and only 2 percent were crustaceans and mollusks mainly caught in the Atlantic Ocean. The main types in the foreign fishing industry are mintay (76 percent), flounder (14 percent) and cod (5 percent). By type, the foreign catch in 1984 (in thousands of tons) was composed of:

Cod	
Atlantic	5.7
Pacific	74.3
Flounder	188.8
Haddock	1.5
Pacific hake	14.8

Mackerel	9.5
Pacific sea perch	3.3
Mintay	
Atlantic	1.2
Pacific	1,033.2
Ygolnaya	3.0
Mollusks	1.9
Squid	14.9
Others	13.7

The largest catch of 1,315,600 tons is in the regions of the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering Sea.

Along with the reduction of foreign licensed operations in its zone, the United States is carrying out an active policy for the development of mixed fishing societies and enterprises with the participation of foreign capital. The basic model of mixed American-foreign enterprise is the catch of large-scale types of fish by U.S. fishermen and their transfer to the ships of foreign partners for processing with the subsequent sale of the products and distribution of the profits in relation to expenditures. There is also an extensive exchange of fish products on the basis of their costs and the interests of the partners.

At the present time in the United States, there are about 40 mixed companies in operations with partners from 11 countries. In 1984, these companies accounted for 22 percent of the total catch of the United States. In the last few years, the greatest increase in the catches was by mixed companies (Table 8).

Table 8.

Object of the Industry	Catch by Mixed Companies, Thousands of Tons		
	1982	1983	1984
Rock trout	12.4	11.3	36.6
Cod	13.8	16.7	38.5
Flounder	26.6	40.0	54.4
Mintay	128.9	283.1	444.2
Squid	-	10.6	6.7
Others	72.9	73.3	84.2
Total	254.6	434.9	664.6

At the same time, the increase in the catch of mixed companies is more intensive than the overall reduction of foreign fishing in the U.S. 200-mile zone.

The United States has a rather ramified network of research institutions in fishing. These are the research departments, laboratories, centers, stations and institutes of the U.S. Commerce Department, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and other federal departments. To name several of them: the national fishing center of the U.S. department of natural resources; numerous research institutes, colleges, schools and stations of the universities of individual states (here one could single out the Scripts Institute for

Oceanography of the University of California); individual large scientific institutions (the oceanographic institute in Woods Hole and departments of the Smithsonian Institute); scientific departments of several private companies in the fish industry; private scientific consulting companies in the area of the fish industry; various noncommercial organizations assisting in carrying out individual scientific programs (American Fishing Industry Society, which makes use of the participation of other countries) and others. Thus, both theoretical and practical research work is being done.

An important place in the applied research for the fishing industry belongs to the federal centers for the fish industry administratively subordinate to the NSMR, which, in turn, relates to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the U.S. Commerce Department. There are four such centers:

--The Northeast Center for the Fishing Industry (Woods Hole, Massachusetts) doing fish-industry research in the northwest part of the Atlantic Ocean, mainly along the coast of the United States. It has laboratories at six coastal sites, has three scientific ships and also charters additional ships.

--The Northwest and Alaskan Center for the Fishing Industry (Seattle, Washington) carrying on research in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea, primarily along the U.S. coast. It has laboratories and stations at three sites, has four scientific ships and charters additional ships.

--The Southeast Center for the Fishing Industry (Miami, Florida) performing research in the central Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. It has laboratories at five sites.

--The Southwest Center for the Fishing Industry (La Jolla, California) carrying on research in the central and eastern parts of the Pacific Ocean using three laboratories, including on the Hawaiian Islands.

All of the U.S. centers for the fishing industry work under numerous bilateral programs and participate in the research of international fishing industry organizations.

In addition, the NSMR directly manages several laboratories in different regions of the United States that monitor the natural environment for the habitat and study questions in the processing of fish, etc. Some scientific services--a worldwide data center, for example--are directly under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The United States permanently cooperates with other countries in different questions involving the utilization of living marine resources in a number of international organizations, including the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Council on the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), the International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), the International Whaling Commission, the Commission on the Conservation of the Living Marine Resources of Antarctica (ANTCOM), the International Oceanographic Commission, and others. The action of the U.S.

delegations in these organizations is aimed primarily at the achievement of their own narrow national political objectives, which often diverts the participating countries away from the resolution of questions having to do with the conservation and rational utilization of the biological resources of the world oceans. At the same time, the U.S. position coincides with that of the other member countries of these organizations in such questions as the conservation and rational utilization of seals and salmon in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, tuna and other matters.

The relations of the Soviet Union with the United States in the area of fishing were established in the 1950's, when the Soviet fishing fleet began to exploit a number of unused fish reserves along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of the United States on the basis of large-scale studies. Prior to the introduction of the 200-mile zone, the total annual catch of the USSR in the waters adjacent to the American coast amounted to more than 900,000 tons. Afterwards, under the conditions of the 200-mile zone--the catch declined to 400,000 tons and, beginning in 1980, operations were ceased because of the discriminatory actions of the United States in relation to Soviet fishing in this region. Operations were resumed in 1984.

Three bilateral intergovernmental agreements currently constitute the legal basis of Soviet-American cooperation in the area of fishing and the utilization of living marine resources: the agreement of 26 November 1976 on fishing along the coast of the United States; the agreement of 21 February 1973 on the review of claims arising in connection with damaged fishing ships and equipment and on measures to prevent industry conflicts; and the agreement of 23 May 1972 on cooperation in the area of environmental protection. On the basis of these agreements, this cooperation was carried out successfully in all areas right up through the beginning of 1980. After that, for political reasons, the American side unilaterally began to curtail cooperation, which caused a certain amount of damage not only to the fishing interests of both countries but also deprived the Americans of the possibility of carrying out joint studies of the fishing industry at the level where they were carried out before. At the same time, because, on the one hand, of the change in the U.S. domestic legislation on fishing toward making the operations of foreign nations in the U.S. zone more difficult and more expensive and, on the other hand, the American use of any "other factors," the traditional participation of Soviet ships in the development of unused living marine resources and their joint study for the purpose of their rational utilization receded far into the background.

The American administration is striving to link the action of the 1976 Soviet-American intergovernmental agreement on fishing with factors that have nothing to do with it and to influence the Soviet Union's fulfillment of its obligations under multilateral agreements, in particular the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of the Whaling Industry, by applying restrictive measures to the Soviet Union, citing the domestic legislation of the United States.

Beginning in April 1985, the so-called Packwood-Magnuson amendment to the law on the conservation of fish reserves and the management of fishing has been applied to Soviet fishing in the U.S. 200-mile zone, as a result of which the

quotas for the catch of our ships in the U.S. zone were reduced by 50 percent for 1985 and the beginning of 1986 and the allocation of quotas was stopped beginning 1 April 1986 in connection with the position of the USSR in regard to whaling.

This policy of the United States caused great damage. Its disturbs the ties between the countries in the area of fishing, poisons the international climate, and creates an atmosphere of instability in relations between states. The U.S. course of economic sanctions and other methods of force in the area of fishing cannot meet with the understanding and support of other countries.

In accordance with the changed fishing practices in the U.S. 200-mile zone, a new form of cooperation was found in 1976--joint enterprise. A Soviet-American fishing company, "Marine Resources," through which fish caught by American fishermen are transferred to Soviet ships, was able to increase the volume of its operations by a factor of 2.5 between 1978 and 1985. To a large extent, the prospects for the development and especially the expansion of this direction of cooperation depend upon the willingness of the partner to work on a mutually advantageous and equal basis without any discrimination.

Broad cooperation is traditionally carried out between research institutes and scientists of the USSR and United States in different areas of the conservation, utilization and management of the biological resources of the world oceans. In accordance with agreements with the United States, Soviet research ships perform research in the fishing industry under joint programs and with the participation of American scientists in the U.S. 200-mile zone. In the years 1980 through 1985 alone, 27 research voyages were made by Soviet ships with the participation of more than 60 scientists, specialists and observers of the northwest and Alaskan and southwest centers for the fishing industry, the universities of Washington and Oregon, and other interested U.S. organizations. There were six meetings of scientists of the USSR and United States on questions involving fishing, in which they discussed research results and outlined programs for future joint work. Soviet as well as American scientists have repeatedly stressed the mutual interest in this form of cooperation and the obvious benefit and possibility of its expansion for the purpose of the study of the biological resources of the world oceans.

The further development of Soviet-American relations in the area of the fishing industry is in the interests of both countries. Qualitatively new relations under the conditions of the changed international legal conditions of the world oceans must be based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage and take into account the mutual interest in the conservation and rational utilization of living marine resources both in the regions of the Chukchi and Bering seas and the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, where there are reserves common to the two neighboring countries, as well as in the world oceans as a whole.

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WESTERN EUROPE

FRG PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 86 p 5

[Article by Ye. Bovkun: "Marathon Until January"]

[Text] After the summer holidays the deputies to the Bundestag assembled at a session in the old Bonn "pumphouse." Henceforth, all parliamentary debates will take place right here--on the premises of a former pumping station, on the bank of the Rhine. The heraldic eagle above the speaker's rostrum testifies to the lasting nature of the functions of the new plenary hall. The former building of the government complex which was used for this purpose is subject to long-term reconstruction.

In Bonn they are also beginning to speak more and more often about a possible reorganization in the political life of the FRG. With the arrival of autumn, the most important and exciting stage of the pre-election marathon at the finish of which--25 January--the outcome of the struggle for the right to form a new government will be decided, began.

The ruling and opposition parties have basically already planned the reference points of future policy. The balance between them is unstable. If we judge from the results of polls of the population, the scales are in constant motion.

The successes of the SPD [Social Democratic Party] in land [territorial] elections in the Saar and North Rhine-Westphalia--and the curve of their popularity goes sharply upward. An ecological catastrophe in North Rhine-Westphalia--and there is an increase in the number of critical votes directed at the Social-Democratic government of this land. The government's approval of antidemocratic corrections to labor legislation which limits the right of the workers to strike immediately turns into losses of votes for the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] at land and municipal elections. By the beginning of September the Christian Democrats slightly improved their poll indices. But can this serve as a guarantee of victory at the forthcoming elections?

With just what baggage did the political parties of the FRG enter the concluding stage of the pre-election struggle? For several weeks already, posters of the CDU which depict a fist with a thumb raised upward appear on round poster posts, trees, and walls of houses. The caption to it, thought up by the general secretary of the CDU, H. Geissler, sounds rather pretentious, with an obvious allusion to the right to represent the interests "of all Germans": "Germany, steady!"

The pre-election platform, which was presented as the common CDU/CSU [Christian Socialist Union] platform, is now being discussed at the CDU Congress which opened in Mainz on Tuesday. This document will finally be approved in a week after elections in the landstag of Bavaria.

The platform promises the burgher new "blessings," in particular, a decrease in the tax burden and the reform of pension support. Foreign policy is also presented in a rosy light: disarmament in the East and West, trust, good neighborliness, and collaboration in relations with the states of the Warsaw Pact.

Some improvement in economic conditions under the present government in no way contributed to the solution of urgent social problems. The big companies gained. Small enterprises are failing one after the other, and the position of pensioners and other poor citizens shows that "price stability" under inflation conditions is a relative concept. The ruling coalition is proud that it succeeded in inhibiting the growth of unemployment. But only the rates of its growth were slowed. Moreover, unemployed who are not registered by the labor exchanges are not considered by the official statistics and, you see, there are almost a million and a half of them. As regards the unemployed youth, even according to official data they have increased significantly. Of what society with "a human face" can one speak if five million citizens of the FRG are living at the edge of "new poverty"; if more than 3.6 million are constantly looking for work and more than two million of them do not have it!

This is shown by the calculations of sociologists and economists. And it is not by chance that new posters have already appeared alongside the loud posters of the CDU. They are pasted up by the young unemployed and students. The same fist, but the thumb is bandaged or lowered downward: "Steady, CDU! New poverty, the environment ruined, more unemployed!"

And what about foreign policy? "Peace with fewer weapons"--in words and 842 million marks in the budget for new Leopard-2 tanks, discourses on NATO defensive concepts....

"We are for new paths in limiting the arms race," it is written in the program. What are these new paths? It turns out, support of the "star wars" plans. Figures of the CDU/CSU speak out for the "universal" banning of nuclear tests. And a group of experts of the Adenauer Fund (an organization close to the CDU) publishes a "scientific" work which substantiates the necessity for the conduct of such tests.

And finally, a thesis with a clear revengist smell. "We represent the interests of all Germans. The German question is open," assert the authors of the draft new CDU program.

Such, in general outlines, are the directions of the present and future policy of the CDU/CSU. True, recently realistic evaluations of the development of an East-West dialog have also begun to appear in the public statements of the Christian-Democratic leaders.

Coalition partners--the Free Democrats--occupy a more consistent position in questions of disarmament. In the social and economic fields the Free Democrats as yet have not proposed any noticeable plans. Nevertheless, the chairman of the FDP [Free Democratic Party], Bangemann, expects high results, hoping to attract to his side a portion of the voters who vote for the Greens.

The Greens have already prepared lists of candidates and determined the basic themes of the pre-election polemics: ecology and disarmament. The positions of the "realists," who are grouped around (O. Shili) and come forth for various compromises, were strengthened. Their traditional opponents--the "fundamentalists"--who are defending the inviolability of several age-old principles of the "Green movement," appear less convincing.

The Social Democrats intend to struggle for each vote. The SDP led by Rau (the most popular Bonn politician today) is counting on the support of the majority of the population, having armed itself with the demands of the broad popular masses. Social justice, new work places, women's rights, a healthy environment--it is these slogans which determine the pre-election strategy and tactics of the SDP. It demands the revocation of the anti-strike paragraph of labor legislation, a shortening of the work week, and improvement in the social status of the poor.

Realistic elements predominate in the foreign-policy concepts of the Social Democrats. The party drew conclusions from former errors and intends to achieve the removal of American chemical and nuclear weapons from the territory of the FRG and rejection of participation in the SDI. The decisions of the Nuremberg Congress on questions of detente are directly opposite Kohl's course. They are based on the conclusion concerning the impossibility of attaining security by military means and that security can only be universal.

The Communists and other democratic organizations united in a pre-election alliance, "The List in Support of Peace." In its pre-election manifesto the German Communist Party [GCP] calls upon the voters to give their votes to the candidates of "The List in Support of Peace" and to support those who come out against the Kohl government, that is, the Social Democrats and the "Greens," since they are capable of accomplishing a change of power in Bonn.

At the same time, the GCP put forth a slogan: unite all democratic forces of the left against the CDU/CSU in parliament as well as out of it. This means solidarity with those political, social, and religious movements which are interested in a change in the political course of the FRG and strengthening its international prestige.

An example of such solidarity is the preparation of the Communists and other progressive organizations for the national anti-war demonstration which will take place on 11 October in Kasselbach where the deployment of American cruise missiles is taking place. Now forums of the democratic public are taking place throughout the entire country on the agenda of which the main place is occupied by questions of war and peace. Under these conditions, it will be difficult for the conservatives to count on a considerable preponderance of sympathies and on the confidence of the voters. The distribution of the deputy mandates inevitably will reflect the antagonism of two trends in the development of the FRG's political life--conservative and realistic.

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CUBAN COMMUNIST ON CURRENT SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 5-9

[Speech by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, deputy chairman of the Republic's State Council and Council of Ministers, "The Struggle for Unity--an Important Direction of Our Policy," at the March 1986 international scientific conference organized by the Institute of Latin America of the USSR Academy of Sciences and entitled "The General Crisis of Capitalism, Foreign Debt and the Liberation Struggle of Latin America"]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress made an indelible impression not only on those of us who were guests and participants in it, but also on people in all corners of the world. Since the 2d Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which became the reference point in the history of the Bolsheviks' party, the party which--under Lenin's leadership--was called upon to lead the peoples of Russia and later the Soviet Union, to carry out the great transformations of our epoch, many party congresses have been historic. However, the 27th Congress has special significance. The exceptional nature of the period which we are living through and the corresponding nature of this forum are felt not only by communists but also by all the progressive forces of the world.

As for Latin America, in particular, the 27th CPSU Congress emphasized once again: the struggle of the Latin American peoples for true independence and profound social transformations is the main feature of the present stage in the region's development. Latin America has been granted an historic chance, which must not be thrown away.

I would like to set out here the Cuban viewpoint on the present situation in Latin America. This viewpoint is shared by representatives of many other countries on the continent. Speaking recently before a group of scholars specializing in Latin American affairs, I reminded them of the results of the 1975 Havana Conference of Communist Parties of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries. The discussion of developmental prospects which took place was not without friction because certain participants veered to one extreme or another. But in the end we adopted a common document reflecting some important trends which have revealed themselves with full force 10 years

later. The situation at that time was very different. As a result of the increase in world oil prices the oil-producing countries had significantly increased their currency reserves, which helped to improve conditions on the international capital-lending markets and to ease the crisis phenomena on the continent.

The year 1981 marked the beginning of the most profound economic crisis experienced by the world capitalist economy in the last 50 years. Its consequences influenced all the Latin American countries almost simultaneously. In 1985 the average per capita GNP in the region fell to the 1976 level. Our continent fell 10 years behind in economic development. By the start of 1986 Latin America's foreign debt had reached \$368 billion.

In the 70's, when the neoliberal concepts of Milton Friedman and various monetarist theories replaced Keynesianism, it seemed to many that an end to crises in the world capitalist economy had been reached. But history once again confirmed the correctness of Marx, and not Keynes or Friedman; it showed that Marxism is an ageless, constantly developing teaching, which responds to the spirit of our epoch.

In 1984 some expansion of Latin American exports (mainly in Brazil) provided some people with a reason to claim that the crisis was easing, that the worst times were over. However, in 1985 the difficulties of the market reasserted themselves once again; the rate of economic growth continued to decline and amounted to only 2.3 percent. At the same time the per capita GNP fell by 2 percent. It is obvious that the structural crisis has become permanent in nature. During certain periods, temporary economic upswings may take place, which create the impression that the crisis has ended, but subsequently there are declines, which become increasingly frequent and severe.

Unprecedented in its severity, the crisis has led to the further polarization of class forces. Research confirms that in all the region's countries, especially Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, the distribution of the GNP is becoming increasingly unfair: 15-20 percent of the population receives 70 percent of the national income, at the same time that the strata which make up 60-70 percent of the population receive only 20-30 percent of the income. This polarization gives rise to revolutionary energy and leads to social explosion.

One more characteristic feature of the present situation in Latin America is the growing expansionism and aggressiveness of the USA. In its time the administration of President Kennedy developed the foundation of the notorious "Alliance for Progress." Reagan and his entourage have worked out their own version of the "Alliance," which is based on the increased flow of foreign capital into the region's countries, on higher norms for their exploitation, on growth in imports and on an ever increasing subordination to the capitalist "center," the USA. This strategy has been accompanied by military threats to the peoples not only of Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador, but also to the peoples of other Latin American countries who are making attempts to find their way to a path of independent development.

The situation which has developed requires the united efforts of the Latin American states. As long ago as Bolivar's time the idea of unity was expressed at the Panama Congress in 1826, and Jose Marti called for it at the end of the last century. However, the region's countries, instead of uniting, preferred to be saved one by one. At the same time that some fought, others carried out a search for compromises.

The Malvinas conflict revealed these defects with complete clarity. It reminded people that the Argentines are also Latin Americans, although the bourgeois elite, and indeed a significant segment of Argentine society, considered itself partly if not largely European. It also showed what the Intra-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, which was adopted in 1947 and widely publicized in its time, was worth. When a threat to an OAS member-country actually arose--from Great Britain in this case--the USA, in violation of its obligations, preferred to support its European partner, with whom it has deep and long-standing ties. This step opened the eyes of many, and it contributed to the renewal, or more accurately, the birth of Latin American public opinion.

In a work written by a Soviet specialist it is claimed that in our time a "watershed line" runs between the imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. However, I think that the basic "watershed line" is broader. In recent years the Communist Party of Cuba has defended this position in principle and has been guided by it in practice. Of course, a permanent "watershed" exists between the anti-imperialist and pro-imperialist forces, but we cannot ignore the fact that the consistently anti-imperialist and progressive forces in Latin America have been joined in the common struggle by strata which cannot be considered progressive but which defend national interests.

For example, we cannot claim that the ruling bourgeois circles in Argentina, much less in Venezuela, have anti-imperialist leanings: such a judgement simply would not be in line with reality. Nor can we recognize unconditionally the anti-imperialist nature of the actions by the ruling groups in Mexico. And one can identify anti-imperialist elements among the Peruvian Aprists. They adhere to an ideology which differs from ours but anti-imperialism is one of its components. One cannot fail to see that broad strata among the bourgeoisie, and even among the oligarchy in a number of the region's countries, have their own conflicts with imperialism and that these forces frequently exert opposition to the aggressive and reactionary policy of the USA. Their own interests push them toward an alliance with democratic forces, toward an alliance which is temporary but no less important because of that. As Fidel Castro noted, the development of Latin American unity as a counterweight to the USA is of greater significance than an accidental revolutionary explosion in any given country, even if the explosion leads that country to socialism. This kind of unity would have an objectively anti-imperialist trend, although subjectively not all of its components would meet this criterion. A broad alliance of forces, which opposes the economic and military policy of U.S. imperialism--that is the target which we Cubans consider to be the most important and timely for today's Latin America.

It should also be noted that, in our opinion, one should not expect the Latin American peoples to move toward socialism in the near future. This, of course, does not mean that we do not recognize such a possibility in those places where the necessary preconditions are developing; otherwise we would not be revolutionaries. For us, Marxist-Leninists, socialism remains a constant goal. And as soon as there arises the possibility that the shoots of a new society may emerge somewhere, we express our willingness to provide moral and political support. However, an analysis of the general panorama of Latin America shows that in the immediate future socialism will not become a reality. The preconditions for the breakdown of the old society and the formation of a new one objectively exist, but subjectively the Latin American countries are still not ready for this. It should be recognized that the continent's leftist forces are prone to frequent splits. This is tragic, but it is so. It is essential to look for a way out of the constant crisis, which has continued to exist in certain leftist parties for nearly 30 years. It is essential to unite forces: only if that is done will there emerge an opportunity to carry out essential and profound transformations.

When one analyzes the situation in any given country of the region, one frequently comes to the conclusion that the leftist forces are potentially in the majority. In the event of unification this formal majority could become a real one, because unity provides a new impulse to the movement and attracts to its ranks those people who formerly stood aside, seeing its weak and splintered nature. If the leftists are united and strong, they will be able to undertake the resolution of radical problems. The struggle for unity is an important direction of our Latin American policy, and we cannot neglect it.

Thus, in the near future the Latin American peoples face more modest tasks than the immediate transition to socialism. The preconditions for this can be created under conditions of revolutionary-democratic regimes. For example, the Nicaraguan comrades are defining their revolution as democratic and pluralistic in the spheres of both economics and politics. Although Nicaragua has forces which sincerely aspire to build a new society, concrete conditions do not make it possible to set socialist goals immediately. That is our viewpoint on this important question.

As a veteran of the revolutionary movement with more than 50 years of experience, I would once again like to express appreciation to the Soviet communists and to the CPSU leadership for that spark and that renewal which the congress gave to the ideals of socialism and, consequently, to the entire revolutionary communist movement. Everything that is taking place in the Soviet Union--we would describe this as a return to an active Leninist style of work not in words but in action--undoubtedly will find a response throughout the countries of Latin America.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

DOMINICAN COMMUNIST ON COUNTRY'S REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 10-17

[Article by Narciso Isa Conde, general secretary of the Dominican Communist Party: "Two Aprils (From the Experience of Revolutionary Struggle in the Dominican Republic")]

[Excerpts] The materials of the 27th congress emphasize the need to intensify work on the targets of the struggle against imperialist oppression. Further, they note that the experience accumulated by communist parties constitutes valuable international property. In determining ways to achieve immediate and final goals, in working to expand class alliances on a platform of anti-imperialist and antimilitary actions, in providing for the defense of the working people's economic interests and political rights, and in taking account of specific national features and the concrete historical situation, as well as the aspirations of various social groups and strata of the population, the communists are discovering new opportunities for the development of the revolutionary movement, and they are setting out new approaches in the struggle for the social renewal of society.

We have a high regard for the role of the CPSU, which acts with revolutionary firmness and tactical flexibility, and which speaks out energetically in the spirit of renewal in favor of unity and solidarity among all detachments of the communist movement and the anti-imperialist movement of peoples, and especially of those peoples who are carrying out battles under conditions of undivided rule by capital.

Our party is fighting under precisely those conditions.

The Latin American continent and the Caribbean basin, where our country is located, has become a region of sharp social storms. The just struggle for the peace, well-being and independence of the peoples living there inevitably takes the form of popular actions of differing types against poverty, foreign indebtedness and economic robbery by foreign monopolies, military intervention, corruption and repressive acts.

Two states are located on our island--the Dominican Republic and Haiti, which are typical examples of the dependent countries of Latin America.

In the Dominican Republic we have a chronic economic crisis; edicts issued by the International Monetary Fund; impoverishment of the masses; a rapacious policy of financial capital and 18 families of multimillionaires, who control the country's economy; government deceit and corruption; and the narcotics trade: as a consequence of these factors there is an increasing loss of faith in the institutions of representative democracy, which is based on the power of a minority. As a result, almost every conflict situation acquires the form of a social explosion.

I will attempt to generalize some reflections concerning the revolutionary experience of the leftist forces in the Dominican Republic in the current social crisis. [1]

The People's Bloc and the Working Class

Given the conditions in our country, it is essential to take account of the revolutionary potential of the popular masses in general. The exploited and marginal strata should be viewed as a conglomerate of social forces which supplement each other. Although no single one of them, including the proletariat, plays a leading role at the beginning stage of the revolutionary struggle, after merging they form a powerful current in of the popular movement.

The April revolution of 1965 and the people's demonstration of April 1984 confirm the correctness of these thoughts.

During the entire period which precedes the winning of power--and this position has already been written into our program--the "proletariat (urban and rural) acts as part of a broad social alliance which combines democratic, anti-imperialist, anti-bourgeois, social and anti-government demands, and in this way genuinely joins in the decisive struggle for the breakdown of the state apparatus, which represents the interests of the ruling social bloc, headed by the bourgeoisie."

At a certain stage the revolutionary activity of the popular masses unfolds in the absence of any social force dominating within the framework of the people's movement. In this regard, the achievement of political power presupposes the concentration of combined efforts by all the moving forces of the people's struggle in order to direct it against the existing order. Unity is capable of overcoming the weaknesses of each of these forces, as well as the helplessness which is caused by their lack of coordination and difficulties of a individual nature.

This kind of approach arises from characteristics of our proletariat's development, from the social structure of Dominican society and from its specific conditions. In this sense the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions have provided many valuable lessons.

The numerically small industrial proletariat, the heterogeneity of the working class and at the same time the absence of clear social boundaries among that class, the group of partially-employed workers, the marginal strata and the peasantry: these are some of the factors, which define the social profile of the proletariat at the present stage of the people's movement.

Clearly, the Dominican working class is a small but very important component of the people, which is linked by numerous threads to other social categories of the working people. Political agreements are essential to turn these ties into a real factor in the unity of the popular forces. By acting within the framework of the alliance of popular forces and under its slogans, the working class can overcome comparatively easily the political and organizational lack of coordination, and it can move more quickly down the path to conscious revolutionary activity. In other words, we are talking about the establishment of conditions to reveal potential opportunities for the proletariat, whose role will grow as the revolutionary process develops.

This is indicated by the specific features of the formation of the revolutionary struggle in our country, features which are the result of direct social antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and mainly the consequence of a general social protest by the population--by all those who are exhausted by intolerably heavy work, by those whom dependent capitalism leads to the brink of death and by those who, in the final analysis, take an irreconcilable position with regard to the ruling bloc and the state apparatus created by it.

This type of growth in the social-political opposition is characteristic of the entire pre-revolutionary stage and part of the transition period following the gaining of power. This is not by any means to downgrade the class struggle of the proletariat or to underestimate its specific role in the alliance of popular forces. The more energetically this struggle is carried on, the greater is the depth acquired by the popular movement and the revolutionary process in general.

The People's Bloc--the Moving Force of the Revolution

One of the main conditions of revolutionary action in a society similar to the Dominican one, consists in the acknowledgement of the difficulties which particular segments of the working people encounter in the struggle.

In comparison with the general political and social tasks of the people's alliance, particular demands (democratic and anti-imperialist, economic and social demands) do not possess enough mobilizing and unifying force capable of driving the powers that be into a corner.

It is also essential to take account of the fact that the dependent type of capitalist development in our country (i.e., the backwardness, heterogeneity of social forces, the lack of unity and the low cultural level) leads the working class to the task of raising its class-political consciousness and forces us to work out a non-traditional line of approach to the workers movement as a component of the movement of the popular masses.

Capitalist societies of the dependent type contain within themselves not only the most important contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but they also give rise to other contradictions, which supplement the first and constitute a separate entity, as well as to conflicts which touch other strata of the population to no less (and even a greater) degree than the

industrial proletariat itself. These conflicts can grow into a revolutionary situation and lead the popular masses--under the leadership of the revolutionary political vanguard--to seize power.

While recognizing the necessity and enormous significance of ideological-political work among the proletariat, it is important to consider that under the social conditions of the Dominican Republic and other such countries the process by which a revolutionary political consciousness develops among the overwhelming portion of the working class is directly related to the latter's participation in the general popular struggle, to slogans which are supported by all strata of the working people and to political goals which are capable of turning the people's bloc into a powerful transforming force.

The Role of Increasing the Political Consciousness of the Working Class

The people's revolutionary consciousness and the growth of its anti-imperialist and anticapitalist potential during the struggle must be viewed as components and steps in the maturation of socialist consciousness, which takes place on the basis of the experience of energetic actions by the popular masses under the political leadership of the Marxist vanguard.

The experience of struggle by the Cuban or Nicaraguan peoples, for example, provides evidence that success in the work of forming a revolutionary vanguard and its victory create favorable conditions within the framework of the transitional period for the working class and all-people's movement to achieve higher stages in the development of political consciousness. However, this does not negate the fact that the previously achieved high level of class consciousness creates even more favorable preconditions for resolving the problems which arise in the transitional period.

The experience of the workers movement in Latin America, especially in the region's least-developed countries, has shown that for certain proletarian strata the transition from populist or reformist consciousness directly to socialist consciousness encounters a number of difficulties. There are some indications that it is necessary to form an "intermediate" level of consciousness--of a popular revolutionary type, let us say--and to combine it with the socialist consciousness of the political vanguard, which gradually wins over the most advanced strata of the popular masses, calling forth qualitative changes in the frame of mind of all working people.

Given a relatively weak national bourgeoisie, this combination could become a socio-political factor, called upon to mark the beginning of a revolutionary struggle for political power.

The Significance of Slogans for the Creation of a People's Bloc

The people's bloc is an alliance of heterogeneous social forces, which has arisen on the basis of their inclination toward unitary political demands, goals and actions capable of arousing the masses to struggle for political power.

In many cases these demands are interventionist and anti-imperialist in nature or represent other social aspirations, which reflect the interests of the entire people. The Cuban revolution, the 1965 April revolution in our country, the Sandinista revolution, and the current Salvadoran process are examples which confirm the correctness of this conclusion. In all of these cases the formation of a people's bloc has become a consequence of antagonism between the people and the pro-imperialist bourgeois order as personified by despotic and repressive regimes.

It is perfectly obvious that in places where the forms of rule are different (populist, Christian-democratic, liberal, etc.), the alliance of people's forces, as a rule, must be formed on the basis of other common political slogans, which sometimes do not evolve all at once. This is explained by a whole series of factors.

In recent years the system of representative democracy in our country has grown stronger as a result of the people's struggle, which has taken place under general democratic slogans. Over the course of several years its mechanism has acted as a unique valve which reduces political tension and limits opportunities to unify and mobilize the masses. If one adds that the strengthening of the dependence on imperialism has taken place through secret channels, it becomes clear why there has been a weakening of the energy in the anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist movement in comparison with 1965, when the country faced a direct armed incursion, as well as a lessening of the popularity of the most important slogans of the past.

These circumstances are frequently used to explain the stagnation in the workers movement and the difficulties encountered by our party and all the revolutionary forces in the period preceding the IMF interference in the internal affairs of the country.

The situation has undergone serious changes by now. A further exacerbation and intensification of the crisis have not only narrowed the opportunities to maneuver for the main forces of the ruling bloc and given rise to difficulties which weaken it, but they have also turned the struggle against hunger, rising prices and IMF policy into a factor which unites the enormous masses of the population. When wages are similar to a drop in the bucket, and a majority of poor families do not have enough to eat, when unemployment and hunger enter villages and cities, when need enters the homes of small and medium-sized property owners, and life becomes more and more expensive, there arises a foundation for general indignation and the incandescence of a nation-wide struggle. The social protest of various strata of the country's population merges rapidly into a single stream.

The events of April 1984 became the starting point for mass actions unleashed against the government and its repressive apparatus; the more harshly it reacts to these demonstrations, the more likely it is that they will grow into a conscious struggle for political power.

The struggle will become broader if a single political-revolutionary platform is formed which is capable of uniting and attracting the popular masses. That

is precisely the problem that the front of the Dominican left is attempting to solve today.

Unity of the Leftist Forces and Formation of the Vanguard

The unity of the leftist forces and the growth of their influence on the people's movement represent a key factor which makes the formation of the vanguard a more goal-oriented process thanks to the activization of the struggle by the working class. A parallel process of intensification and consolidation of the various forces which make up the people's bloc and improved coordination of their actions presuppose at the first stage the achievement of an effective political alliance, which takes the form of a front or a bloc.

As there is movement from this to second stage, it is essential to undertake efforts to overcome the fragmentation and lack of coordination among organizations which operate in the workers environment. There must be a conscious attempt to achieve--within the framework of one party--the organizational unity of all (or the most representative) Marxist organizations of the country which have influence among individual segments of the proletariat and various social strata of the population which are objectively interested in anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist transformations. Only in this way can one put an end to the dispersion and political-organizational fragmentation of the country's working class. Only in this way can a vanguard be formed which is capable of carrying out broad political work within the masses.

However, the task of turning the people into the main subject of the revolution is not limited to this. It presumes a merger with other segments of the popular masses which favor fundamental social transformations, as well as the creation of a single political organism, which would preserve the independence of the parties and organizations which make it up, but would also use joint slogans, demands and programs which express short-term and subsequent goals to facilitate the conversion of the people into a single force which opposes the system of exploitation and oppression.

Our two Aprils and the invaluable experience of struggle by other Latin American peoples provide evidence that by following this path we will achieve the desired goals.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

HONDURAN COMMUNIST ON SUCCESSES IN HONDURAS, LATIN AMERICA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 18-25

[Interview with Rigoberto Padilla Rush, general secretary of the Honduran Communist Party, place and date not specified: "New Political Factors and Our Tasks"]

[Excerpts] [Question] How would you characterize the changes in your country's internal political situation?

[Answer] In answering this question we must once again remember that today we are encountering what is virtually "gunboat policy." It has been put into action once more. North American war ships are furrowing Caribbean waters. The combined military maneuvers by U.S. troops and the Honduran army are nothing other than a new form of military occupation. I will cite some figures: there are about 700 U.S. servicemen at the base in Palmerole, and during the most "intensive" periods there are up to 1,700 soldiers from the North American marines. This is already more than enough for a country such as ours. Add to this 10,000 to 15,000 military service people on aircraft carriers. The government of Roberto Suazo Cordova put at the Pentagon's disposal 15 landing strips for various types of airplanes, from Cessna's for reconnaissance to gigantic Galaxy C-144's, which are capable of transporting hundreds of people and many tons of cargo.

When a committee headed by the not unknown Henry Kissinger made a "lightning visit" to Honduras, the Honduran government presented him with a confidential document containing a truly shameful proposal. It amounted to the following: convert our country into a kind of protectorate of the United States, similar to South Korea and put North American military bases in Honduras on a permanent basis... And for this, for the sale of the country in other words, Honduras is owed \$10 billion. Also taken into account was the fact that the country has access to two oceans, as well as land boundaries with three states, whose peoples oppose North American domination--Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. It is worth noting that this proposed deal was exposed by the bourgeois newspaper TIEMPO (published in San Pedro Sule), which is the mouthpiece of one of the factions of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie... On January 27 during the official ceremony marking the transfer of power to Jose Simon Azcona Hoyo at the National Stadium in Tegucigalpa, more than 40,000

Hondurans--in the presence of foreign delegations--heckled Suazo Cordova, and he was pelted with rotten fruit and eggs. In this way the results of his rule were summed up. In this way the people expressed their attitude toward the policy of subservience to American strategems, and they branded with shame the policy of conspiring with reactionary military circles and encouraging their intrigues against Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti Salvadoran Front.

On the eve of the election we had for the first time in the history of Honduras nine whole candidates running for chief of the executive branch: there were candidates to suit every taste but--it goes without saying--within a certain framework--from extremely right-wing to some who were even considered "pink." And this is what is interesting: staff members from the U. S. State Department held private talks with all of these people (who nourished ambitious hopes), literally persuading them not to let matters get to the point of a split in the traditional parties, and assured them that favorable opportunities would be opening up for all except, naturally, for the communists...We did not participate actively in the electoral process, fearing the criticism from many representatives of the leftist forces, which amounted to the charge that such participation is supposedly right-wing opportunism. As a result we did not put before our people--and we recognize that this was a mistake--a democratic electoral alternative. And at the very last moment we, the communists, could do nothing else but call publicly for the voters to go to the polls to vote for those candidates who took the most account of the demands of the people's movement: to put an end to the military occupation of the country, to dismantle the military bases, to reject the arms race, to achieve mutual understanding with Nicaragua, and to respect civil rights and democratic freedoms.

[Question] How would you describe the situation in Central America in general?

[Answer] What is taking place in Central America at the present moment? When Bayardo Arce Castano, vice-coordinator of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, made a welcoming speech from the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress, he stated that despite the economic blockade, the barbaric raids by counterrevolutionary bands from the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica and the refusal of credits by international financial institutions, Nicaragua, thanks to solidarity, has been able to survive. The Sandinista People's Revolution succeeded in inflicting a strategic defeat on the Somozaist counterrevolutionary forces. Despite military assistance from the United States and the complicity of their local allies, the "contras" have not managed to take control of any important populated area in Nicaragua.

In another country of the isthmus, El Salvador, the attempt to defeat the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) failed. On the contrary, it is the front which has the initiative in combat actions. In my view, the following fact is interesting. Not so long ago General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, the ex-president of Honduras, stated in an interview with the Prensa Latina Agency that, in his opinion, the FMNL represents a force with sufficiently great capacity to maneuver.

The aggressive policy of the USA in our subregion is experiencing a crisis. Because of this, the U.S. State Department is undertaking maneuvers which were planned some time ago to change the political facade of Central America. We must not lose sight of this when examining the recent elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. As for Costa Rica, elections there are a traditional attribute of political life. Although it is appropriate to note that a country which recently bragged that it had more teachers than soldiers can hardly make such a claim now. I suggest that now there are more soldiers. Within the ranks of the Costa Rican National Guard there is essentially a kind of army growing up, and it is being fostered by North American advisers, who have come to this country under the guise of "engineers."

Having put into motion an electoral farce, the United States managed to some degree to stabilize the government in El Salvador. It is also essential to take into account the fact that during this episode the leader of the extreme rightists, D'Obusson, failed.

A few words about the situation in Guatemala. Although the new president, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, is young, he has already participated for many years in the country's political life and possesses substantial experience. He has never vacillated, expressing quite transparently his positions on Central American questions and specifically the so-called Nicaraguan problem. He has come out in favor of respect for the will of peoples and noninterference in their internal affairs; he has spoken out against a policy of open interventionism. He favors a government of "democratic participation," and an end to the activities of semi-military bands.

In general we must not underestimate the significance of these new political factors in Central America. The discussion, of course, concerns limited democratization. After all, the repression and murder of political figures and activists from political parties and movements (and not only communists--that has already become a "tradition") but also democrats, social democrats and Christian democrats--has acquired such a scale, and the militarized bands and "death squads" conduct themselves in such an unbridled fashion that even quiet democratic experiments give rise to certain hopes.

Under these conditions it is appropriate to set ourselves the question: what will happen next? What are the prospects? We, the Honduran communists think (and we stated this at our 4th congress), that there is no other solution to the national problems than the path of fundamental national-democratic changes. We are contributing with all our strength to the search for a peaceful political solution to the Central American conflicts; we support the initiatives of the "Contadora group"; we are fighting against intervention in Nicaragua and throughout Central America; we are working for the dismantling of the military bases on our territory and the withdrawal of foreign occupational forces from it.

Our appeal finds a favorable response within the milieu of social democracy, which is now making attempts to create a new party in Honduras, as well as among relatively influential strata of the Christian democrats, the liberals, clergy, and even the armed forces. We are prepared to conduct a dialog with

everyone, regardless of his political ideas and philosophical views, who intends to struggle with us for the restoration of our homeland's sovereignty.

[Question] Would you go into more detail on the new phenomena in the Central American policy of the USA?

[Answer] The world is changing. Changes are also taking place on the Latin American continent as well. The Stroessner and Pinochet dictatorships are living out their last days. They will collapse under the blows of the people's movement. The struggle for democracy is acquiring an ever increasing scale. It should be recognized that Washington is responding to this quite rapidly. In Central America and the Caribbean the Reagan administration is beginning to introduce new elements into its policy. The goal is to present everyone with a "normalized landscape," a picture of bourgeois democracy which could be set out in contrast to the situation in countries where "totalitarian" governments (they have in mind Cuba and Nicaragua) are in power.

As you remember, Carter attempted at the last moment to change the facade of Somozaism, but Urcuyo lasted for a total of 24 hours. The wave of the people's movement was so powerful that it swept away Somozaism and neo-Somozaism. The masses rejected the plan for Somozaism without Somoza. In the same way Washington started to think about this phenomenon and about Carter's last-minute actions, and this was reflected specifically during the recent events in Haiti. However, these same events show that not everything is subject to North American control.

One cannot fail to observe a definite link between events in Haiti and White House attempts to renew political facades in Central America.

Yes, the range of democratic freedoms has expanded somewhat, but at the same time the elite and the most reactionary circles in the army remain. For the most part they will continue as before to support the foreign policy of Washington, which throws bands of "contras" against Nicaragua from our territory.

Reagan talks openly about his goal, which is to get rid of the government of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

I would like to add that the undeclared war also includes the subversive work carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. In Honduras, the CIA is after all absolutely uncontrolled. Moreover, the repressive apparatus which exists in the country is under direct CIA control. This especially applies to the modern equipment and methods which are used in Honduras to discover the supporters and participants of the people's movements, as well as to the counterblows and warning blows which are inflicted upon these movements. This work is being carried out by means of a modern electronic apparatus and a computer installation; thousands of informer-agents have undertaken this work under the guise of reporters for newspapers, magazines, radio and television. In addition, sociologists go from house to house, from village to village, from housing project to housing project and question people according to a

previously prepared list of questions on the most diverse subjects. These data are then processed by computers and conclusions are drawn concerning possible and potential opponents to the regime existing in the country and to North American policy.

Let us look once more at the updated political facade in Honduras. In describing the changes, we stated at our 4th congress that the Ascona government was elected by the people but nonetheless looks to a very narrow social base for support because it came to power as a result of maneuvering and with the help of the so-called scenario B. This government is not capable of resolving the vital problems which face the country.

I would like to emphasize once again that not everything is being played according to the score written in Washington. In Honduras the masses are taking to the streets, young people are holding up colleges, peasants are seizing lands, demonstrations in favor of civil rights are being expanded, and the campaign for solidarity with Nicaragua is gaining strength. There are also significant and visible results of this struggle such as, for example, the fact that the army command was forced to remove from their posts officers who were found guilty of theft and attempts to murder leaders and activists of the people's movement.

[Question] And in conclusion, I would like you to tell us about your 4th party congress.

[Answer] The congress was extremely representative, despite the fact that it took place underground. The new party program and changes in the charter were discussed.

The congress heard a detailed political report, which provided a general summary of our activities beginning in 1978. It contained an analysis of the international situation, the situation in the region and the situation which has developed within the party. Also outlined were the prospects for the struggle to win national sovereignty, to eliminate foreign military bases on our territory and to achieve respect for and the observation of human rights. We demand not only that the subdivisions of the repressive apparatus be disbanded but also that a careful investigation be carried out with regard to its criminal activities--theft, torture, and murder of Honduran citizens, including members of our party--and that the guilty parties be fairly punished. We also favor a foreign policy for Honduras which would be in the interests of our people, i.e., would be based on the principle of the observation and respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination.

We have a minimum program and a maximum program. In the realization of the minimum program we are counting on the cooperation of those social and political forces which have manifested a desire to fight for these goals. We also extend a hand to the Catholic Church and to those circles in the army which express dissatisfaction with the situation in the country. We must not forget that up to 90 percent of Latin Americans are Catholics. The situation within the church itself has changed. Many priests, even bishops, inspired by the so-called liberation theology, are joining the struggle against the

oligarchy and imperialist domination. To be specific, they state: "We do not desire to receive information through third-hand propaganda. We want to hear the communists directly in order to know what their views are, what they think about the Catholics and believers in general, and about that which unites us in the struggle to free the people from poverty and exploitation." We are searching for--and finding--a common language with these priests.

The congress emphasized that it is essential to make new efforts to get closer to the masses and to work out new approaches to the achievement of this task. We think that even our lexicon, the lexicon of the communists, must undergo change. We must work out new forms and a new type of unity with the movement of the masses.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL AIMS, WORK OF SANDINIST REGIME VIEWED

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[Article by I.M. Bulychev: "The SNLF--the Ideological-Political Vanguard of the People's Revolution"]

[Text] In 25 years the Sandinista National Liberation Front has traversed a long and difficult path of development from small organization of young Nicaraguan patriots to generally-recognized leader of the anti-dictatorial movement; at present it is the advanced detachment of the popular masses in the building of the new Nicaragua. The ideological-political platform of the SNLF has crystallized in the process of the revolutionary struggle; a strategic policy with regard to winning political power and a majority in revolution has been worked out, and an intensive search has been carried out for its own style of leadership of the working masses.

The leader of the Sandinista people's revolution, Carlos Fonseca, has made a significant contribution to the establishment of the theoretical bases for the Sandinista movement and the practical realization of its ideals. He was the first to undertake the profound study and interpretation of the ideological legacy of the legendary Augusto Sandino, as well as the creative unification of this legacy with the very rich experience of the world revolutionary and liberation movement. He focused his attention on the resolution of such complex questions as the path for the development of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process; the interrelationships within that process of general patterns and national features; and the moving forces and forms of the antidictatorial struggle, etc. In determining the content and nature of the tasks faced by the Sandinista people's revolution, C. Fonseca emphasized particularly that "we are not talking about merely changing the people in power, we are talking about changing the very system, we are talking about the overthrow of the exploiting classes and the victory of the exploited classes." [1]

Daily and persistent work among the laboring masses; the establishment of firm ties with the peasant population in those regions in which the support bases for the Sandinistas' armed struggle were created; and the patient explanation of the basic SNLF goals helped to expand the social base of the Sandinista movement and to draw the broad strata of Nicaraguan society into it. However,

this was complicated by the incomplete nature of the class-formation processes and the low level of the population's political maturity. The period of establishing ties with the masses, of overcoming the fragmentation of forces and creating a revolutionary organization without which, as C. Fonseca said, "there cannot be action," [2] was also accompanied by military defeats for the Sandinistas.

The initial stage of the SNLF's combat actions in the 60's showed how unlikely they were to succeed without reliable support from the popular masses, as well as careful military-political and organizational preparation. The experience acquired in these years helped the Sandinistas to discover the movement's weaknesses and to concentrate their efforts on overcoming them. Gradually, as a result of activation of the People's Civilian Committees, which were established with the help of the SNLF in poor urban neighborhoods, as well as the Revolutionary Student Front, and as a result of the close ties with the population in rural areas, the influence which the traditional parties of the bourgeois opposition to the Somoza regime held among the masses began to weaken. The 22 January 1967 shooting by the dictator's guard of a peaceful demonstration in Managua, organized by the Conservative Party and supported by certain other political forces, dispersed the illusion which existed among certain strata of the population that it was possible to conduct a legal struggle within the framework of the electoral farces organized by the dictatorship. Despite a number of serious defeats for the SNLF during this period (especially in August 1967 in the mining region of Pancasan), C. Fonseca wrote that there was "growth in the political prestige of the Sandinista National Liberation Front among the broad popular masses." [3]

The historic SNLF program adopted in 1969, which clearly outlined the strategic policy of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process, was an important instrument in mobilizing the masses for the struggle against the dictatorship. In contrast with the plans of the bourgeois opposition, the program called for the implementation of fundamental transformations of the political and socio-economic structure of society. It was essentially an expression of the urgent demands of the overwhelming majority of the country's population, which had enormous significance for rallying around the SNLF not only the working people of the city and countryside but also representatives of other social forces.

Having provided a powerful impetus to the development of the revolutionary struggle in the rural areas and major cities, the program helped to further strengthen the positions of the SNLF not only as a military organization but also as an influential political force. The Sandinistas' self-sacrificing struggle in the name of achieving the goals set by the 1969 program and their flexible tactics with regard to the potential participants in the anti-dictatorial struggle predetermined to a significant degree the successful resolution by the SNLF leadership of the complex and extremely important strategic task of gaining a majority in the revolution. With the assistance of the broad coalition created under SNLF leadership, the "United People Movement," which brought together more than 20 mass organizations and became the nucleus of the National Patriotic Front, which was formed at the final stage of the anti-dictatorial struggle, the Sandinistas were successful in fundamentally changing in their favor the alignment of forces in the political

arena. They were able to cut off all attempts by a conservative-liberal bourgeois faction, headed by the so-called Broad Opposition Front, to limit--with U.S. support--the fruits of the people's victory to a single plan for extremely moderate and limited reforms.

The September (1978) uprising, which became a kind of general rehearsal before the decisive battles, accelerated the process by which the SNLF was transformed from a leader of the armed struggle by the popular masses into the generally recognized vanguard of the Nicaraguan revolution. The uprising showed that the most important and essential condition for victory over a dictatorship is the strengthening of the vanguard's own solidarity. [4]

In December 1978 a decision was taken, which was later embodied (in March 1979) in an agreement about the establishment of the United National Leadership of the SNLF. [5] This document emphasized that the SNLF's most immediate task included the revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, the organization of Sandinista power and the construction of a people's revolutionary democracy, which would lay the foundation for the intensification of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process.

The victory of the Sandinista people's revolution marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the history of Nicaragua. In overcoming backwardness there is a multitude of extremely complex tasks to be solved during this stage. The discussion concerns primarily the construction of a new political system, the restoration of a destroyed economy, the realization of urgent social programs and the maintenance of a reliable defense for the revolutionary gains. In living up to Sandino's tenets "the SNLF announced an historic plan of the workers and peasants, which has opened up a new world of democratic relations at all levels of national life." [6] The plan worked out by the SNLF for revolutionary reconstruction is based on principles of political pluralism and a mixed economy, the consolidation of national unity and non-alignment; it is being carried out under the extremely difficult condition of unceasing imperialist aggression and growing confrontation with the forces of internal reaction. Given these conditions, particular importance is attached to the work of achieving further organizational solidarity and attracting the popular masses, who do not have any traditions of participation in the country's socio-political life, to the process of national renewal; importance is also attached to the work of raising the level of their political and class consciousness. The mass organizations which have been created--the Sandinista Trade Union Center of Workers (SST), the Sandinista Defense Committees (transformed from the Civil Defense Committees, which emerged in September 1978), the Association of Agricultural Workers (ATC, which received official status in December 1979), the Louisa Amanda Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan Women (the predecessor of this organization was AMPRONAC), the 19th of July Sandinista Youth--were transformed into a reliable base of support for the revolutionary authority. While consistently carrying out a policy aimed at the development of these organizations, the SNLF National Leadership attributes top-priority significance to the activation of the working people in the city and countryside, and it emphasizes that its "efforts are concentrated primarily on the organization and consolidation of the SST and ATC". [7]

While directing the revolutionary energy of the working masses into the creative channel of the national renewal process, the SNLF National Leadership is attempting to provide all-around support for their initiatives: whether it is for the movement of worker innovators or for the "red-black" (the colors of the Sandino banners and the SNLF) Sunday work days in which volunteers (rural and urban working people or students) participate. In the course of the revolution there continues to intensify a process which helps to strengthen the ties between the masses and the vanguard, to overcome difficulties and eliminate errors, and to strengthen the revolutionary democratic state. In linking the changes taking place in the country with awareness on the part of the popular masses of their role, the official SNLF organ, the newspaper BARRICADA, emphasized: "The class of the working people is no longer and never will be again a simple producer, it is the conductor and builder of the new Nicaraguan society." [8]

The implementation of the SNLF program on the fundamental transformation of the socio-economic structures, the democratization of society, and on the construction of the bases of the new Nicaragua has been accompanied by the process which is inevitable and characteristic of every genuine social revolution--the accelerated delimitation of political forces and the sharp exacerbation of ideological opposition. Acting legally within the framework of the political pluralism declared by the revolution, the bourgeois opposition is making use of its own political experience and propaganda apparatus (the newspaper LA PRENSA, etc.) as well as certain church circles in an attempt to weaken the mechanism of SNLF ties with the masses, and to undermine the people's trust in the policy of the revolutionary government. By organizing campaigns which distort the genuine meaning of the changes taking place in the country and by fanning the difficulties which stem from the backwardness and undeclared war by American imperialism, the right-wing parties are hoping to play on the low level of class consciousness of a certain segment of the working people. Given the acute ideological struggle which has been unleashed, the SNLF National Leadership has come to face the task, to use V.I. Lenin's words, of "tearing the masses ideologically from the reaction," and of establishing effective daily political-inoculation work among the population.

In this work a large role is allocated to explaining the ideological legacy of Augusto Sandino, the heroism and wholehearted devotion to the cause of the revolution and national liberation shown by Rigoberto Lopez Perez, Carlos Fonseca and many other patriots who gave their lives for the freedom of the people. In this effort the experience of other countries which have freed themselves from imperialist exploitation and oppression is used extensively. The appeal of the SNLF National Leadership (NL) to the Nicaraguan people notes that "it is important to strengthen the daily ideological struggle among the working people and youth, which will make it possible to present imperialism and its internal agents more clearly..." [9]

In viewing Sandinism as a "revolutionary science applied to a concrete reality," the SNLF NL is striving for the organic unification of its basic principles with the general patterns of world revolutionary and national-

liberation movement and for the elimination of exaggeration in regard to specific features of its own experience.

The winning of political power presented the SNLF with a series of new tasks related to the restoration of the national economy. Immediately after the victory of the revolution, the property of the dictator's clan and his camparilla was completely confiscated (Decree No 3 of 20 July 1979). However, the nationalization which was declared was not universal. It extended to banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, natural resources and a number of enterprises in the leading branches of the economy. Within the framework of the "mixed economy" model which was declared, a significant private sector was preserved and the state guarantees its development. In confirming the invariability of the state policy on the stimulation of the private sector "in all branches of production," D. Ortega, president of the country and coordinator of the Executive Committee of the SNLF NL, said in one of his interviews: "We are experiencing a profoundly popular, democratic process, which is striving to move forward and to enjoy the support of all political, economic and social strata for the achievement of genuine social justice in the interests of the overwhelming majority." [10] This is a manifestation of the strategic course of the SNLF NL and the revolutionary government aimed at developing constructive dialog with representatives of the various circles of Nicaraguan society which are sincerely interested in the successful continuation of the process of national renewal and in the defense of the homeland against imperialist aggression and the intrigues of the counterrevolution.

Thus, the economic program of the revolutionary leadership is oriented not only toward the restoration of the destroyed economy but also toward the strengthening of national unity. When analyzing the social forces participating in this process, many researchers correctly direct attention to the fact that the basic and most representative force consists of the "workers, poor peasants, small and medium-sized producers in the city and countryside, as well as the middle strata of the population, who have made their own contribution not only to the process of struggle, but also to the historic task of building a new society." [11]

The process of the institutionalization of the people's revolution, which is being intensified under the leadership of the SNLF, and the important landmarks of which are the law on political parties (August 1983) and the law on elections (March 1984), has been accompanied by a tense inner political struggle, by increased disagreement within the opposition parties, by a noticeable activization of the opposition of the internal reaction, whose statements are to an increasing extent coordinated with the subversive actions of the "contras." The right-wing political parties--members of the so-called Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee--have tried to disrupt the conduct of elections and the course of the democratization process in the country. The principled position of the SNLF and the consistent implementation of the course aimed at the development of the basic platform positions of the Sandinista revolution, including the principle of political pluralism, doom the intrigues of the reaction to defeat.

The complexity of the current stage in the development of the Sandinista revolution, which results to a significant extent from the aggressive actions of the U.S. administration and its mercenaries, forces the SNLF NL and the revolutionary government to devote enormous attention to measures which will reliably secure the gains of the people. The country's present strategy for defending the revolution is based, first, on support from the working masses, who are directly linked to production (mainly the workers and peasants) and who possess a high moral-political level, as well as from the professional revolutionaries and student youth; second, on the comprehensive assistance of the revolutionary state to the Sandinista armed forces and, third, on the leading and guiding force of the SNLF. "We think that the deciding role in our concept of defense must be given to the organized people, because nothing can replace the masses--that great Army," said Umberto Ortega, member of the Executive Committee of the SNLF NL, minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Sandinista People's Army, in one of his speeches. [12]

The development of the Nicaraguan revolution puts on the agenda the question of the further building of the party by the SNLF. Even in the first years of the struggle against the dictatorship, C. Fonseca talked about the importance of establishing a Sandinista party which is closely linked with the popular masses. [13] From the very beginning the SNLF was viewed by its founders as a military-political organization, which fulfills simultaneously certain tasks and functions of a revolutionary party. Its leadership constantly focused attention on how to proceed with the steady organizational expansion of ties with the popular masses, how to draw them into participation in the Sandinista movement and how to develop and search for new forms; in the final analysis this has determined the vitality of the SNLF and its ability to reach its stated platform goals. "Without the vanguard," noted Tomas Borge, one of the SNLF founders, a member of its Executive Committee, and the minister of internal affairs, "the revolutionary potential could not have been turned into a powerful popular fist capable of overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship." [14]

The significance of the problems of party construction is not declining at the present stage. How to increase the ranks of the SNLF is one of the questions which was discussed at the 1st National SNLF Conference held on 21-23 September 1979. At the conference the collegial nature of the highest leadership organ of the SNLF, which has come to be called the SNLF National Leadership, was confirmed. Questions of how to improve the work with the masses and organizationally strengthen the SNLF have also been the focus of attention at subsequent conferences. An important decision was taken during the 3d SNLF National Assembly (13-15 September 1980, Managua). Speaking at conference opening, T. Borge said that the time has come to mobilize the best forces to complete the building of the revolutionary party, whose main task will become the "complete elimination of exploitation and economic dependence." In this regard, particular attention was directed to the fact that the foundation of such a party must consist of workers and peasants, as well as representatives of the patriotic forces, i.e., all those who "are prepared to die for the motherland, the people and the revolution." [15]

In order to work out the most important national tasks and to take decisions with regard to those tasks (the discussion concerns, in particular, the preparation of the party program and charter) the Sandinista Assembly was formed as an advisory organ; the structure of the SNLF was reorganized, the Political and State Committees were established, as was the Committee on Defense and Security; and the National Secretariat was formed, which monitors implementation of decisions by the SNLF NL. A Committee of Departmental Leadership (CDD) of the SNLF was formed in every department of the country. The SNLF structure thus formed helped to ensure more reliable ties with the masses, and clearer coordination of SNLF activities. As a consequence, the CDD's--in connection with the division of the country into six regions and three special zones--were transformed into the SNLF Regional Committees, which are headed by political secretaries. An SNLF Committee of Party Leadership was established to coordinate the work of the SNLF organs within the system of state institutions.

The annual sessions (as well as the special sessions) of the Sandinista Assembly have great significance. At its first session (February 1981) committees were formed to prepare a draft of the SNLF charter and to study the role of the working class in the Nicaraguan revolutionary process. The second (29-31 January 1982, Managua) put forward "the defense of the nation and the revolution" [16] as the most important task of the Sandinista Front and the Nicaraguan people. In this regard, questions of party construction and the training of cadres at all levels were viewed as a "component of the constant defense of revolutionary principles."

The first party cards were handed over to veterans of the liberation movement, to participants in the armed struggle against the dictatorship, to the best workers and peasants and to worthy representatives of the Nicaraguan intelligentsia. Political education schools providing accelerated courses have been opened, and nation-wide ideological campaigns are held regularly, in which detachments of the "ideological militia" take an active part.

The Sandinista mass information media play a large role in the conduct of this work, along with the existing system of party education: these media include first of all the newspaper BARRICADA, the official SNLF organ; the magazine PATRIA LIBRE (now BOCAI); other publications; as well as the Sandinista radio and television systems. An important place in the political education of the masses is assigned to regular appearances by members of the SNLF NL on programs called "Face the People," and during their regular trips throughout the country, as well as to talks at production collectives, etc. The attack against illiteracy, which has made it possible to sharply reduce the number of Nicaraguans who cannot read or write, is extremely important to the work of raising the political consciousness level of the masses.

The regular session of the Sandinista Assembly, which was called on the eve of the 5th anniversary of the revolution, was an important event in the life of the SNLF. The session chose SNLF candidates to participate in the forthcoming general elections. D. Ortega, who spoke at the session (he, as is well known, was nominated as a candidate for president) announced the detailed SNLF program for 1984-1991 entitled "Plan of Struggle." This important document

met with warm approval and the support of the popular masses. In his speech D. Ortega said: "The Sandinista Front and its National Leadership, the highest political leader of the Sandino people," promises to guarantee the honest fulfillment of our historic program and to continue tirelessly, persistently and with all our strength the struggle for the people's right to build a new society, free of exploitation and exploiters, for which more than 200,000 Nicaraguans have fought since the last century and given their lives." [17]

T. Borge made a speech at the session. He read out a message from the SNLF NL and provided a comprehensive analysis of its activities in the preceding period. T. Borge noted that the intensification of the revolutionary process is directly linked to its institutionalization, which, in turn, requires that we "move forward with renewed energy to develop and strengthen the party of the Nicaraguan revolutionaries--the SNLF--which is the backbone of the revolution, the preserver of revolutionary purity and the guarantor of strategic steadfastness." Further, he emphasized particularly the importance of strengthening unity: "We are not talking about artificial unity forged at the price of silence or falsification; we are talking about unity based on a clear program and pure banner." [18]

The official registration of SNLF candidates in the Higher Electoral Council took place on 23 July 1984 on the historic day of SNLF formation. In this regard the newspaper BARRICADA wrote in an editorial that having emerged as a "military-political detachment, the SNLF has become the "herald of the modern vanguard of the Nicaraguan people." [19]

The convincing victory of the SNLF at the country's first genuinely free and democratic elections confirmed its leading role in the process of building the new Nicaragua, and it demonstrated the support of the working masses for its strategic line. The emergence of qualitatively new organs in the political system of Nicaraguan society sets before the SNLF the task of further working on the relations between the party and the state apparatus and of raising the effectiveness of its leadership of the popular masses and of the struggle against manifestations of bureaucratism, etc. All these questions were the focus of attention at the special session of the Sandinista Assembly which took place in early August 1985. At the session it was noted that the present moment dictates the need to improve the political-organizational structure of the SNLF for the purpose of strengthening its vanguard role in Nicaraguan society.

Decisions were taken concerning the Executive Committee of the SNLF NL (it replaced the Political Committee). Daniel Ortega, the country's president, was elected coordinator of the committee. The role of highest leading organ of the SNLF was once again assigned to the SNLF NL, five members of which make up the Executive Committee. The Sandinista Assembly (consisting of no more than 105 people) remains a permanent advisory organ of the SNLF NL. The structure of the auxiliary departments of the SNLF NL was confirmed, and the functions of all the organs of the party system (regional committees, zone committees, base committees) were more clearly defined.

Speaking at the session, D. Ortega emphasized that since the moment of its emergence the SNLF has been a "party of the people, tied to the workers and peasants, who are leading the self-sacrificing struggle for justice, freedom and independence"; it is an "historic response" and a "synthesis of the unceasing struggle of our people against Yankee imperialism, a struggle for the great social transformations, which will free the Nicaraguan working people from the yoke of capitalist exploitation and oppression." [20]

The new structure of the SNLF reflects the experience of practical operations by the front accumulated during the years of post-revolutionary construction as the political leader of Nicaraguan society and as the organizer of the masses for the purpose of resolving the tasks of state and economic construction and defending revolutionary gains. Raising the political activity level of the masses and drawing them into the direct management of the state and production--all this dictates the need to raise as well the level of political leadership and to further strengthen the ties with the masses. The guarantee of this lies in strengthening the unity and monolithic nature of the SNLF, in consolidating national unity in the name of the Sandinista people's revolution. Speaking at the 27th CPSU Congress, Bayardo Arce Castano, vice coordinator of the Executive Committee of the SNLF NL, emphasized that the "revolution continues to draw strength from the masses and from the very close ties of the Sandinista Front with the people." [21]

In this are manifested both the general regularities of the revolutionary-liberation struggle and the features particular to the Nicaraguan process of national renewal, in which an important role is assigned to political pluralism, a mixed economy and adherence to the principles of the nonaligned movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. Fonseca. "Obras." Managua, Vol 1, 1982, p 82.
2. Ibid., p 236.
3. C. Fonseca. "La Hora Cero." Managua, 1979, p 3.
4. "El Sandinismo: documento basicos." Managua, 1983, p 276.
5. A. Cesar Sandino, C. Fonseca Amador. "FSLN Nicaragua: La estrategia de la victoria." 1980, p 256.
6. "La democracia participativa en Nicaragua." Managua, 1984, p 9.
7. "La revolucion a traves de nuestraDireccion Nacional." Managua, 1980, p 72.
8. BARRICADA. Managua, 1 May 1983.
9. BARRICADA. 19 May 1984.
10. POLITICA: TEORIA Y ACCION. Santo Domingo, No 48, 1984, p 17.

11. "America Latina 80: democracia y movimiento popular." Lima, 1981, p 430.
12. "Habla la Direccion de la Vanguardia." Managua, 1981, p 81.
13. C. Fonseca. "Obras," Vol 1, p 237.
14. CUADERNOS DEL TERCER MUNDO. Mexico, No 63, 1983 (Separata Especial), p 5.
15. "Habla la Direccion de la Vanguardia," p 34.
16. BARRICADA INTERNACIONAL. Managua, 20 February 1982.
17. BARRICADA, 18 July 1984.
18. Ibidem.
19. BARRICADA, 24 July 1984.
20. BARRICADA, 4 August 1985.
21. PRAVDA, 4 March 1986.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

MASS ORGANIZATIONS' ROLE IN NICARAGUAN POLITICS, GOVERNMENT

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 69-84

[Article by V.N. Mironov: "Revolutionary Power and the Masses"]

[Excerpts] "Organization, organization and more organization!" Slogan of the Nicaraguan Revolution

V.I. Lenin's thesis that the main question in any revolution is the question of state power is widely known. [1] In making the Leninist understanding of this question concrete, A. Gramsci noted that the resolution of the problem of power is in essence the resolution of the problem of how to unite the entire mass of the working people into an independent, centralized system of organizations, headed by the party, and the problem of how to create a state apparatus, which would act democratically within its own sphere, but outside that sphere would ruthlessly destroy all organs of the economic and political power of capital. [2] In other words, the question of power is primarily the question of how to organize the masses under the leadership of the vanguard into a new revolutionary power, which is called upon to break up the old state apparatus. In fact, the revolution represents the explosive incursion of the organized masses into politics and the destruction of all barriers which separate the people from power. Politically K. Marx defined a genuinely democratic, popular revolution as the "transition of power to the popular masses themselves, who create their own strength in place of the organized strength of their oppression..." [3] The essence of revolution, noted V.I. Lenin, is "the concentration of all state power in the hands of the working people and the exploited masses. They themselves, these masses, take politics into their own hands, that is, they take up the work of building a new society." [4]

These fundamental historical patterns have found manifestation in the Nicaraguan revolution. It was essentially an explosive incursion of the broad popular masses into politics as the main creators of history. T. Borge, member of the National Leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF), and minister of internal affairs, pointed to the "enormous participation of the masses before and after victory..." [5] as one of the most important features of the Nicaraguan revolution. The revolutionary struggle was not a matter of a small vanguard, but rather a movement of the

broad strata of the people: the working class, the peasantry, the "old" and "new" middle strata (the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the students, religious figures, etc.), who were united by their hatred of Somozaism and by the desire for radical social changes. In the course of this struggle there was a genuinely spiritual and political rise of an impoverished and semi-literate people: the masses, who had become corrupted and degraded by decades of a deceitful and terrorist dictatorship, were turned into active creators of history and were able to give an armed uprising such a massive character that even Western specialists said it had no equal in Latin America. [6] And it was their participation in the antidictatorship struggle which became the deciding factor in the victory of the revolution; however, the combat actions of the Sandinistas were one of the main conditions for the "unleashing" of activity by the people. "Indeed, it was always thought," emphasized H. Ortega, one of the SNLF leaders, "that the masses must be viewed as support for the guerrilla war in order for the guerrillas to be able to break the National Guard. But in fact, the result was just the opposite: the guerrilla war was an additional link in the struggle of the masses, who stirred up the insurrection and triumphed over the opponent..." [7]

The broad participation of the masses in the armed struggle was the deciding factor in the formation of a new revolutionary state order, as well as the primary reason why the entire mechanism of the dictatorial power, including the main source of the regime's support--the Somoza National Guard--was completely smashed. The break up of the old repressive state machine was an action of the most profound democratism because it provided access to democracy for the masses and gave them the opportunity to organize themselves for the independent exercise of power. Moreover--and this has the greatest significance--the struggle to break up the military bureaucratic apparatus of the oligarchy contributed in a decisive manner to the organization of the masses. The Nicaraguan revolution confirmed the truth that the old exploiting state, like a machine for the production of a concrete class-exploiting type of power, could only be defeated by another machine capable of producing power of a revolutionary type. "...The new power," emphasized V.I. Lenin, "does not fall from the sky, instead it grows up and emerges alongside but against the old power, in a struggle with it." [8] In fact, the new revolutionary state in Nicaragua grew out from the thick of the revolutionary masses long before the victory of 19 July 1979. By late 1978 the forms of the revolutionary state order had been established for the most part, including the local organs of power, the people's militia and the army; the process of creating the highest organs of revolution was also going on. In essence, during the 1977-1979 period of the revolutionary situation, the country developed the important elements of dual power, which was fully confirmed by the summer of 1979 with the formation of the Provisional Government of National Renewal. The people received a wealth of governing experience in the liberated cities and zones. Leon, for example, was the first city in which the revolutionary committees took upon themselves the management of the main public services.

With the destruction of the Somozaist state apparatus the dual power set-up came to an end. Moreover, this destruction was carried out in such a radical manner that the management of society became impossible without drawing the

broad masses into this work. "The masses," noted L. Carrion, one of the SNLF leaders, "have, gained through their struggle against the dictatorship the right to participate in the management of the country. We must create organizational mechanisms for that participation." [9]

Naturally, this breakthrough to power by the masses, this radical expansion of democracy could not fail to provide an extreme wealth of new forms for the organization of the masses. The newly emerged revolutionary state, on the one hand, existed thanks to the recruitment of the masses into politics, and, on the other hand, it stimulated this participation and drew hundreds of thousands of people into political life.

The organizational basis of the new revolutionary political system was to be found in the numerous and diverse organizations which ensured the mobilization and active participation of the people in the management of society. In the course of the revolution a real explosion of the organizational creativity of the masses took place: more than 30 various mass organizations emerged. "Beginning in the mid 70's, at the initiative of the SNLF, the workers at plants joined together into the Revolutionary Workers Committees and the Movement of the Working People. In 1976 the SNLF and the Catholic activists organized committees of agricultural workers, which in 1978 became the Association of Rural Workers (ATC). In 1977 the SNLF helped to establish the Association of Women (AMPRONAC), which had conducted the struggle for women's rights, against the violation of human rights by the Somoza regime. In 1978-9 AMPRONAC and the SNLF helped to establish the Civil Defense Committees (CDS), whose function was to support the struggle against the dictatorship. In the final stages the workers organizations, the CDS and some armed units of the SNLF led the uprising in the cities, while another army unit--with the support of the ATC--carried out combat actions in rural areas." [10]

The Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) play a system-forming role in all the mass organizations. Their predecessors were the Civil Defense Committees, which arose in September 1978 in the heat of the struggle against the dictatorship and fulfilled both political as well as military functions. "The masses demonstrated a great (perhaps even the greatest) capacity for revolutionary creativity: the Civil Defense Committees were established where ever the insurgents took power ... The revolution received the highest form of the organization by the people, i.e., organization which is capable of taking power at the grass roots." (11) After liberation, the process of CDS formation extended to the entire country. As C. Nunez, one of the SNLF leaders noted, "the first mass organization, which is developing with head-spinning speed, (and this is completely natural and correct), is to be found in the Sandinista Defense Committees... By now they represent the broadest and most extensive organization of all those which exist in the country." [12] By the end of the first year of the revolution the SDC's encompassed more than 220,000 people. In 1985 they encompassed more than 500,000 people.

As an organization with a clearly class nature, which brings together the productive force of the nation, the SDC's are an important force in the implementation of numerous campaigns: the elimination of illiteracy, the provision of medical assistance to the poor, the implementation of tax

control, the conduct of agrarian reform, the distribution of food, the organization of sporting events, etc. In discussing the purpose of these organizations, T. Borge noted: "It is essential to develop a collective life on every block. On every street people must come together to discuss their problems... They must make decisions..." [13] and it is precisely as organs in which the initiative of the masses is recognized that the SDC's have not only enormous political but also moral significance. For example, one of the SDC activists, a shoemaker by trade, said: "One could say that in the two hours which I spend at SDC sessions, I could make a pair of shoes and earn several pesos. But it is necessary to break away from thinking in this way because this would mean making it possible for others to think and decide for me, as was the case before. The tradition of organization is very important for us." [14]

Having created these mass organs through their own efforts, the Nicaraguan people have created a democracy which qualitatively exceeds any models of liberal democracy in any bourgeois state, inasmuch as every exploited person participates directly in decision-making. The newspaper BARRICADA has called the SDC system "democracy which comes from the streets." [15] And it is in these and other mass organizations that the extremely valuable experience of direct democracy is realized and accumulated, a democracy which provides an opportunity for the entire mass of the exploited people to participate in the resolution of the most important state questions. The mass organizations truly have become the genuine school of democracy.

In the course of the revolution's development, a mechanism has developed in Nicaragua for the close interaction between the mass organizations and the state apparatus. For example, the SDC's have their own representatives in many state institutions. The SST [Sandinista Trade Union Center] participates in the leadership of the Ministry of Labor, the ATC in the conduct of agrarian reform and student organizations in the work of the Ministry of Education, etc. Thus the very high democratism of the Nicaraguan revolution consists precisely in the fact that the organized masses are fulfilling the functions of the state apparatus, and this is a radical expansion of democracy, an expansion which has brought the enormous majority of the population to the management of society. B. Arce, one of the SNLF leaders, emphasized that "an instrument of the power of the working classes is to be found in their own mass organizations." [16] They are the body and the foundation of the entire revolutionary political system. According to CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, the theoretical organ of the French Communist Party Central Committee, "the mass organizations are developing structurally and are being strengthened in order to become the core of the new Nicaraguan state...the Sandinista Defense Committees are being turned into centers of "people power," where all the problems of everyday life are discussed." [17] In essence, the SDC's are political organs, which are fulfilling the functions of local self government. Without them the higher organs of power would hang in mid-air. Moreover, without the SDC's, revolutionary power would be impossible. T. Borge noted that "people's power is being built on the basis of these committees. The SDC's are the most important means of mobilization and daily revolutionary work, especially with regard to the political and ideological struggle; they

constitute a wall, which restrains the intrigues of the bourgeoisie and imperialism." [18]

In fact, it was necessary to start virtually from zero to build new state institutions. "When we created the Ministry of Internal Affairs," said T. Borge, "there were only six of us. There was no policy and no security service, there were no courts and no supreme court, there was absolutely nothing." [23] But the Nicaraguan revolutionaries were able to utilize the "miraculous means" (in the words of V.I. Lenin), which make it possible to increase immediately, in one stroke, the state apparatus by a factor of ten: that is, through the political activity by the workers and their desire to participate in the management of the state. [24] In the summer of 1979 the activity level of the masses reached a level that made it possible for the revolutionary vanguard to present an initiative for the formation of higher organs of the new state order. Even before the overthrow of Somoza, in June of that same year, the Government of National Renewal was formed; it came forward with a program which stated that the Council of Government carries the entire executive and administrative responsibility in the state. The State Council was declared the legislative organ (along with the Council of Government); the members of the State Council are specified as being the political and socio-economic organizations functioning in the country: the SNLF, the National Patriotic Front (FNP, which brought together seven party and trade union organizations), the Broad Opposition Front (FAO--which also represents seven parties and trade unions) and the Higher Council of Private Businessmen (COSEP). The basic political rights and freedoms were guaranteed in the program. The most important part of it lay in the provisions according to which the political structures of the Somoza dictatorship were completely destroyed, the National Guard was disbanded, the special services were abolished, and all repressive laws were repealed. The supporters of the dictatorship who participated in the mass repressions were declared outlaws and subjected to the tribunal courts. Special articles called for the establishment of a national army and people's police. The program also defined the basic directions in a democratic foreign policy, based on the principles of non-alignment and anti-imperialist solidarity. [25]

The revolutionary army represents one of the main forms of participation by the masses in the political process. As a genuinely mass organization with a clearly defined class nature, it maintains politically oriented relations with the public. As B. Arce noted: "The workers and peasants possess an important instrument of power in the armed forces, an army. The heart of the matter here lies not only in the principles to which the armed forces are subjected, but also and especially in the class composition of the Sandinista People's Army... and the organs of state security." [28] In essence, the revolutionary authority draws its support from the armed masses: several tens of thousands of submachine guns and rifles have been distributed to the population. In explaining the need to arm the people, B. Arce said at the 27th CPSU Congress: "The revolution is unfolding in an atmosphere of war. For this reason the peasants, upon receiving land, take up rifles in order to defend the revolution." [29]

The Sandinista National Liberation Front plays a leading role in the political system of revolutionary Nicaragua. From its very inception the SNLF has been aimed at activating the masses and drawing them into the political process. This very important goal was achieved in the course of a self-sacrificing armed struggle begun by a small organization. However, the front never was a purely military organization; it essentially fulfilled many functions of a political party. Long before the victory of the revolution the SNLF gained political hegemony in the general democratic movement because it was able to convert an armed struggle into a cause of the broad masses. Naturally this is why the insurgent masses--after the overthrow of Somoza--put forward the Sandinistas to head the revolutionary state. "When we came out of the trenches," said H. Ruiz, one of the SNLF leaders, "we had to take upon ourselves the role of national leaders, of state figures. This task inspired fear in us but governing is an art, it is not something inborn, something which just appears already in one's head. We fought successfully, although we were not soldiers. We became guerrillas, although we were not born as such. We were not politicians. It was the revolution and our people who demanded that we take upon ourselves this role." [30]

The SNLF has deep roots in the mass organizations. These organizations are the drive belt between the population and the front's higher organs, passing on advice and instructions to the masses, and requests, desires and the aspirations of the masses to the leadership. The bilateral ties between the front and the Sandinista Defense Committees have decisive significance for strengthening the SNLF's vanguard role in the state, and for developing the activity level of the masses. In essence, the SDC's act as a kind of informal grass roots organization of the SNLF; as a result the front functions essentially as a mass party with a broad social base. For this reason one does not have to join the SNLF to be a Sandinist. At the beginning some SNLF leaders viewed the SDC's as the "embryos" of a future mass party. It is the SDC's, in the words of one of the Sandinista activists, which "ensure the continuous dynamic interaction between the vanguard and the masses and make it possible to avoid bureaucratization." [32] Thus the criticism directed at the Sandinistas by the "left" that their power supposedly "is not able to resolve the fundamental problems of the masses," that it supposedly "demobilizes the masses, and will restore the old class society..." is completely unjustified. "In essence, this will be a transitional regime, which will facilitate a shift to the right." [33] This judgement, which is based on the experience of the Portuguese revolution, does not take account of the "comprehensive nature" of the SNLF influence on the masses, nor the role and growing significance of the mass organizations. The firm bilateral ties with the masses; the implementation of the people's monitoring function, which is exercised by the mass organizations; and the collegial nature of the leadership--all this guarantees the SNLF will not suffer from elitism or a Thermidorian degeneration.

In this way the system of power in Nicaragua represents a genuine democracy for the "grass roots." While profiting from the broad participation of the masses in political life, bourgeois ideologues try to prove that in essence a regime of totalitarian dictatorship has been established in Nicaragua, which supposedly deprives individuals of elementary freedoms and rights. But in

fact, the logic of the class struggle in a transitional period consists precisely in the fact that freedom for all can be established only by limiting freedom for counterrevolutionary exploiting groups, by which they understand the struggle for the restoration of the previous order.

A person's rights in Nicaragua are first of all the right to work, to elementary medical assistance, to education, housing and, finally, the right to human dignity. The Nicaraguan revolution has given these rights to hundreds of thousands of people. In order to ensure these rights it has defeated the old political system, established national control over the basic means of production, introduced planning into the economy--everything that conflicts with the so-called freedoms so dear to liberals and capitalists and which signify, in essence, the right to exploit those who have nothing except their manpower. The Nicaraguan revolution has proved once again the truth that there are no abstract "human rights," that the discussion must concern the concrete, i.e., the class understanding of these rights. Just one day after the victory of the armed uprising, the Government of National Renewal promulgated a Law Concerning the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans, in which political rights occupy a prominent place. For example, article 25 stipulates: "All citizens enjoy the following rights with no limitations: a) the right to establish political parties or to be members of them; b) to participate in the resolution of state questions, directly or through their freely elected representatives; c) to submit written requests ... in individual or collective form to official institutions or the state authority with the right to receive a speedy reply; d) to elect and be elected, to have access to state officials under universal conditions of equality." [35]

With a worsening class struggle, and especially with the growing threat of intervention, certain limitations on democratic rights and freedoms are inevitable. A state of emergency is in effect in the country; however, this does not prevent the opposition parties from actively participating in political life. [36] Despite some limitations and the war which is, in fact, taking place on its territory, Nicaragua is the most democratic country on the Latin American continent. This was fully demonstrated during the elections for president, vice president and members of the National Assembly, which took place on 4 November 1984. The opposition had widespread opportunities to conduct an election campaign. Seven parties took part in the first free elections in the country's history. Despite the boycott by the right-wing parties, about 80 percent of the citizens took part in the voting. Despite the fact that the elections were held under conditions of a developing revolution, there were no limitations on electoral participation by the exploiting classes.

In essence, one question--the question of power and its interrelations with the masses--was put before the voters for their judgement. The reaction, which was incapable of resolving this fundamental question of power by military means despite the support of U.S. imperialism, attempted to resolve the fundamental question of revolution by bourgeois democratic methods. Its intention was to take advantage of the elections in a bourgeois manner, i.e., to make them the main and only form of participation by the masses in political life. This would have made it possible to reduce the activity level

of the masses, limiting their participation to the passive act of "casting a vote," and in this way to tear them away from the vanguard. The enemies of the revolution wanted to establish a system of bourgeois parliamentarianism, to squeeze the mass revolutionary process into a Procrustean bed of bourgeois democracy and in this way to alienate the masses from power. This method is by no means new: The Social Revolutionary-Menshevik and Cadet counterrevolution attempted to turn the January 1918 elections for the Constituent Assembly in Russia into something similar.

However, the reaction's calculations failed. The elections of 4 November did not turn out to be elections of the bourgeois type. The right-wing forces did not succeed in restoring the basic mechanisms of bourgeois democracy. In the course of the election the "holy of holies" of this type of democracy--the principle of bourgeois pluralism--suffered a crushing defeat. The realization of this principle led to a split in the masses, alienated their political will and ability to resolve their own problems themselves in favor of party organizations competing among themselves, and it thus doomed them to passivity. Under conditions of bourgeois pluralism it is not the masses who determine party platforms; they only choose from a number of those proposed. When proposing their programs, the parties--given conditions of mass passivity--essentially shape their inclinations in a direction which is advantageous for themselves. Even a philosopher as hostile toward the masses as Ortega y Gasset was forced to recognize the following on the subject of bourgeois elections: "In universal voting it is not the masses who are deciding; their function is to attach themselves to the decision of any given minority." [37]

The elections in Nicaragua established pluralism with a different class content. This type of pluralism is not characterized by the multi-party principle (several parties existed in revolutionary Russia of 1917-1918); instead it is characterized by a qualitatively different kind of relations between parties and the masses. With pluralism in the sense generally accepted in the West, the strength of parties lies in the passivity of the masses. In the pluralism realized in Nicaragua, their strength is directly related to the activity of the people. In the latter case it is not the masses who serve the parties, but, on the contrary, the parties who serve the masses. The internal counterrevolution, as well as the Reagan administration, reject the pluralism which has developed in Nicaragua as a fiction, because the level of the masses' activity and consciousness make it impossible for the parties to manipulate them. It is the people who control the parties.

Nor is a political mechanism such as elections neutral with regard to class. Their nature depends on the type of power; the level of participation by the masses in politics; the level of development achieved in direct, i.e., non-parliamentary actions by the working people; and on the level of activity shown by their class organizations.

In fact, democracy in a genuine, revolutionary-class understanding does not consist of voters choosing (even if freely) one of several proposed programs, but in the masses themselves making decisions on all the most important questions rather than delegating their sovereign right to the professional

"masters of power" and the bureaucrats. In one of their first statements on the subject of elections the SNLF leadership said: "For the Sandinista Front democracy is not limited just to the sphere of politics and cannot be reduced to the people's participation in elections. Democracy is not simply elections. It is something greater, something much greater. For the revolutionary, for the Sandinista, it means participation by the people in political, economic, social and cultural matters.... Democracy does not begin and does not end with elections...Democracy means the participation of the workers in the management of plants, enterprises, cooperatives and cultural institutions. In summary, democracy is the intervention of the masses into all spheres of public life." [38] And it was the existence of this kind of democracy which the elections confirmed. They signified not simply the presentation by the masses of a mandate for power to any--even the most revolutionary--party but a voluntary pledge of even greater self-activization and the acceptance of full responsibility for the fate of the country and the burden of governing it. They revealed that the electoral behavior of the masses fully coincides with their direct actions and that the electoral (arithmetic) majority coincides with the revolutionary majority. This circumstance confirms the revolutionary resolution of the question of power which the people made on 19 July 1979.

The new higher organs of state have begun their work. Of great significance for the regulation of this activity was the law adopted in February 1985 by the National Assembly concerning its own status; it regulates the procedures for the formation of parliamentary factions and the frequency at which assembly sessions are to be called. The law stipulates the right of the president to impose a veto on parliament's decisions. The president also has the power to promulgate financial and administrative decrees which have the force of law. The new law grants the National Assembly the right to impose a state of emergency in the country in the event of foreign aggression or a threat of aggression.

In August 1985 a 22-deputy commission of the National Assembly was formed under the chairmanship of C. Nunez, member of the SNLF NL, to work out a new constitution; all seven parties represented in the higher legislative organ presented their proposals to this commission. In September 1985 the SNLF also presented its document on this question; it consisted of 20 points. Speaking before the National Assembly deputies on this subject, President D. Ortega stated that in the opinion of the SNLF the constitution must include the basic gains of the revolution: the elimination of exploitation of man by man and the creation of a democratic system which guarantees participation in the management of the state by all political, social and economic strata of the nation. The constitution is called upon to firmly fix such principles of the revolution as anti-imperialism, the defense of the motherland, national sovereignty and independence. The basic law must establish the right of every peasant to a land allotment; the right of working people to health care, education, housing; the right of free association in trade unions and other organizations; and the right of free access to the mass information media. The country's basic document must establish the nationalization of foreign trade, the banking system and natural resources. [39] In general, the majority

of the right-wing opposition parties noted the positive nature of this document.

The commission also heard the opinions of social and religious organizations, as well as the opinion of parties not represented in parliament. The commission members went to countries in Western Europe and South America, as well as to the socialist states to learn about their experience of writing constitutions. A widespread discussion was initiated throughout the country for the purpose of developing a final draft of the constitution, which, as B. Arce stated at the 27th CPSU Congress, "will legislatively establish the realistic course being followed by the Sandinista Front which is aimed at a mixed economy and political pluralism, as well as the policy of non-alignment." [40]

In early 1986 the Nicaraguans began open meetings to discuss this draft; this process revealed once again the democratic and popular nature of the revolution. This nation-wide discussion will be taken into consideration when the draft constitution is completed and reviewed by the National Assembly in the course of 1986.

In this way both the elections themselves and the activities of the new higher state organs, having in essence opened up a new stage in the development of the revolution, strengthened the Sandinista state to a considerable degree. The strength of this state lies only partly in the support of a strong army, the security organs and a centralized administrative system: it lies to an even greater degree in the broad and active participation of the masses in state management. V.I. Lenin said with surprising accuracy: "The bourgeoisie only recognizes a state as strong when it can with the whole might of the government apparatus throw the masses wherever the bourgeois rulers want. Our concept of strength is different. According to our ideas, the state is strong through the consciousness of the masses. It is strong when the masses know about everything, when they can judge everything and embark upon everything consciously." [41] It is for precisely this reason that the cultural revolution, which was unleashed and which is inseparable from the political process, has enormous significance for the strengthening of revolutionary power. Its main goal is the complete destruction of the old ideological institutions of domination by the bloc made up of imperialism and the local oligarchy and the establishment of mechanisms to ensure the victory of the new, revolutionary ideology. During the cultural revolution there was a breakdown of the ideological institutions of the Somoza state. Changes in the class nature of the state power also exerted an enormous influence on the masses.

A very important component of the cultural revolution is the elimination of illiteracy. After all, the backwardness of the masses and the low level of their culture and consciousness were a very important condition of the ideological provisions of the Somoza dictatorship. Virtually the entire country was converted into an enormous school. An extensive system of political education also took shape.

Also contributing to the increased hegemony of the revolutionary forces is "political socialization," i.e., the process of introducing revolutionary ideals into the consciousness of the masses, as well as the creation of new traditions and a new patriotism. Thousands of streets, squares, airports, and ports are beginning to bear the names of heroes who fell in the liberation struggle; new revolutionary holidays have been established; cities have been decorated with political slogans; school curricula have been radically re-worked; and revolutionary songs and books are being written. In short, the people's revolutionary consciousness is being formed. This phenomenon is a kind of "Sandinization" of public life and institutions; it represents the antithesis of Somozaism. As T. Borge noted, the moral victory of the revolution consists in showing the moral superiority of Sandinism over Somozaism. At the same time Sandinism itself, which was originally a kind of anti-imperialist populism for the petty bourgeois and middle strata, is becoming imbued with a consistent class content. A new political culture and new political consciousness, which contain very important components of the most advanced world outlook, are being formed in Nicaragua.

In the course of the revolution in Nicaragua a revolutionary-democratic power of the broad strata of the people, which includes the working class, the peasantry, a significant portion of the bourgeoisie and the middle strata, has been established. In terms of its social nature the current power is transitional in character. Within the framework of the political system a very acute struggle is taking place between two trends: the revolutionary trend, on the one hand, which leads to the further democratization of the state, and in the future to the evolution of the revolutionary-democratic state into a system of complete sovereignty by the people; and, on the other hand, the bourgeois counterrevolutionary trend, which is objectively aimed at reducing the revolutionary-democratic nature of the current state and at restoring the mechanisms and essence of the supremacy of capital (whether in the forms of bourgeois democracy or open fascist dictatorship). The seven-year history of the revolution provides grounds for the conclusion that it is precisely the first trend, despite all the difficulties and desperate opposition of the ruling classes, and despite its prolongation, which is the leading trend. The deciding factor here is the recruitment of the masses to the political process as conscious and active participants in it.

FOOTNOTES

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14. Cited according to G. Black. "Triumph of the People. The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua." London, 1981, pp 240-241.
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23. Ibid. p 91.
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35. "Zakon o pravakh i garantiyakh nikaraguantsev" [Law Concerning the Rights

and Guarantees of Nicaraguans] in the book "Ideynoye naslediye Sandino" [The Ideological Legacy of Sandino], pp 292-293.

36. BARRICADA, 27 February 1986.

37. H. Ortega y Gasset. "La ribellione delle masse." Bologna, 1962, p 41.

38. PATRIA LIBRE. Managua, No 28, 1983, p 52.

39. PRAVDA, 7 September 1985.

40. PRAVDA, 4 March 1986.

41. V.I. Lenin. "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, p 21.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TO USSR INTERVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 86 pp 99-101

[Interview with Federico Bravo, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador from the Republic of Argentina to the USSR, date and place not specified: "In the Spirit of Mutual Respect and Cordiality"]

[Text] [Question] June of this year marked the 40th anniversary of the resumption of Soviet-Argentine diplomatic relations. We know that you, Mr. Ambassador, were a member of the Argentine mission which arrived in Moscow in 1947. Would you please characterize Soviet-Argentine ties, their prospects and answer the question concerning the areas in which they could receive further development.

[Answer] With regard to the approaching date, it is very pleasant for me to note that relations between our countries have been developing all these years in the spirit of mutual respect and cordiality. For this reason the future, too, is viewed in a favorable light.

In the area of the struggle for peace there is a similarity of views on a broad range of questions. Argentina, along with five other states, is a member of the "Group of six," which emerged in Delhi in 1984. At that time we directed to the great powers an appeal to reduce nuclear arms in order to avoid the self-destruction of humanity, having stated that the "problem is too serious to leave its resolution exclusively in their jurisdiction." In May of this year the appeal was handed in written form to the leaders of the USSR and the USA. In its response the Soviet government expressed satisfaction on the subject of this initiative.

I am firmly convinced that in this area our viewpoints largely coincide since our peoples possess courage and above all strive for peace.

I think that cooperation with the USSR in the struggle to establish a new international economic order will also be essential. Argentina, along with other developing and poorly developed countries is experiencing the difficult consequences of the "rules of the game," which were unilaterally established by the more economically powerful countries. As a result we have an enormous foreign debt, which, along with excessive interest payments, is strangling our

economy. And to top it all off, there is protectionism, which is imposed to completely reduce to nought the results of our economic development. All this leads to the thought that more attention should be given to the current problems of overcoming our disastrous position.

Let us cite concrete data. In 1984 the developed capitalist countries enriched themselves at the expense of Latin America by \$30 billion purely as a result of the drop in prices for our goods and because of the policy of subsidies and protectionism which is being carried out by these countries. The states of our continent are making the appropriate efforts, but despite these efforts, the average per capita income has dropped to the level of 10 years ago.

As for foreign trade, the Argentine-Soviet trade exchange is expanding every day. Its growth has been particularly noticeable in recent years, and this applies especially to Argentine exports. In 1981 it reached a maximum, with a value of approximately \$3.5 billion. The trade exchange is carried out on the basis of agreements signed in 1980-1981 concerning meat and grain. In January of this year the agreement on grain was extended for five more years. In 1985 we supplied the USSR with a large amount of grain (with a total value of \$1.146 billion) and products such as (in order of significance) butter, wool, leather and petroleum coke.

At the last session of the joint Argentine-Soviet Commission on Commercial-Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation an agreement was reached for the purpose of reducing the imbalance in our trade; it called for Argentina to purchase Soviet machinery and equipment worth no less than \$100 million per year. It stipulated that the following be purchased from Soviet foreign trade organizations: mining equipment, fishing vessels, airplanes, helicopters, road equipment, trucks, oil drilling equipment, as well as entire complexes necessary for Argentina to develop its own agricultural equipment industry and its own car industry.

Relations in the area of culture are being expanded constantly. In January of this year a cultural agreement was signed during the USSR visit of our foreign affairs minister, Dante Caputo. It includes points aimed at strengthening and developing friendship and cooperation between our countries. The Argentines are well acquainted with Soviet artists representing the most varied types of artistic endeavor. During the past year alone we had performances by the Moscow circus, the puppet theater and artists from the Bolshoi Theater. This provides evidence that neither distance, the language barrier, or differences in ideology and way of life are obstacles on the path to mutual understanding and to the establishment of friendly ties between our peoples, who are linked by high ideals of peace, justice and equality.

[Question] Mr. Ambassador, what significance do you attach to the exchange of visits between the leaders of our countries?

[Answer] I already talked about the visit of Argentina's foreign affairs minister. Dr. Dante Caputo met in Moscow with the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR minister of foreign affairs.

During these meetings important topics such as the problem of nuclear disarmament were discussed.

A visit by Argentine president Raul Alfonsin to the USSR is expected this year, and undoubtedly this, too, will contribute to the strengthening of our mutual relations.

In conclusion, I would like to convey through the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA my sincere greetings to the Soviet people and the USSR government, along with warm wishes for happiness and prosperity.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

USSR-ANGOLA PROTOCOL ON EQUIVALENCY OF EDUCATIONAL DOCUMENTS

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK (OTDEL VTOROY) No 18 of 1986 carries on pages 267-269 a 500-word protocol on the recognition and equivalency of educational degrees and other documents awarded either by the Soviet Union or Angola. The protocol's aims are the "further development and strengthening of relations in the spheres of education, science and culture between both countries" as well as to "establish norms for mutual recognition" of educational documents and degrees from either country. The protocol consists of seven articles and was written in both Portuguese and Russian. It was signed in Luanda on 21 April by G.Yagodin of the Soviet Union and A. Teyshyra from Angola.

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